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WILL MORE AGGRESSIVE MARKETING PRACTICES 
LEAD TO GREATER TORT LIABILITY FOR 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG MANUFACTURERS? 
Richard C. Ausness' 
Manufacturers of prescription drugs have begun to market 
their products more aggressively than they did in the past. 
These marketing efforts are not confined to health care profes-
sionals alone; pharmaceutical companies now engage in exten-
sive direct-to-consumer advertising on radio and television, in 
the print media, and even on the Internet. While these promo-
tional efforts no doubt increase sales, they may also lead to 
greater tort liability for drug-related injuries. The most likely 
theories of liability are failure to warn and negligent market-
ing_ Liability for inadequate warnings will almost certainly 
increase if courts abandon the learned intermediary rule and 
require drug manufacturers to warn consumers instead of phy-
sicians when they engage in direct-to-consumer advertising. In 
addition, injured consumers may make negligent marketing 
claims in cases where there is evidence that pharmaceutical 
companies have pressured physicians to over-prescribe their 
products or where these companies have failed to e;(ercise some 
control over doctors or pharmacists who facilitate abuse of pre-
scription drugs. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At one time, prescription drug manufacturers directed their 
promotional efforts solely at physicians and other health care pro-
viders.1 They provided information about their products in the Phy-
* Ashland Oil Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A.. 1966; J.D. 
1968, University of Florida; LL.M., 1973, Yale University. This Article grew out 
of a presentation which I gave as part of program entitled "Current Issues in 
Toxic Torts & Products Liability." This program was sponsored by the Indiana 
University School of Law-Indianapolis and Eli Lilly & Co. and was held at the 
Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis at Indianapolis. Indiana on Oc-
tober 10, 2001. I would like to thank Professor Andrew R. Klein and Associate 
Dean Susanah M. Mead for inviting me to speak at the program and for their 
encouragement and assistance in connection with the writing of this Article. 
1. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1247 <N.J. 1999) <observing 
that "[p]harmaceutical manufacturers never advertised their products to pa-
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sicians' Desk Reference and sometimes placed discreet advertise-
ments in medical journals and other professional publications.
Sales representatives also visited doctors' offices on a regular basis
and provided them with brochures and product samples.2 The tort
liability regime of that era reflected the fact that prescription drugs
were different from ordinary consumer goods. Thus, while section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts prescribed strict liability
for most products,' it classified prescription drugs as "unavoidably
unsafe" products and largely exempted the sellers thereof from strict
liability.4 In addition, courts uniformly applied the learned inter-
mediary rule in products liability cases. This doctrine effectively in-
sulated drug manufacturers from liability for failure to warn as long
as they provided adequate warnings to physicians.!
Beginning in the late 1980s,6 however, drug companies discov-
ered that they could greatly increase the market for their products
by advertising directly to consumers instead of limiting their mar-
keting efforts exclusively to physicians.7 As a consequence, these
companies began to advertise prescription drugs in mainstream
newspapers like the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, in
popular magazines, on radio and television, and on the Internet.8 It
is estimated that drug manufacturers now spend more than $1 bil-
lion a year on such direct-to-consumer advertising.9
These changes in traditional marketing practices have gener-
ated calls for increased liability on the theory that prescription
tients, but rather directed all sales efforts at physicians").
2. Donald E. Thompson II, Comment, The Drug Manufacturer's Duty to
Warn-To Whom Does It Extend?, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 135, 144 (1985).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
4. Id. cmt. k; see also Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products
and Strict Products Liability: What Liability Rule Should Be Applied to the
Sellers of Pharmaceutical Products?, 78 KY. L.J. 705, 707 (1989-90).
5. See Catherine A. Paytash, Note, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine
and Patient Package Inserts: A Balanced Approach to Preventing Drug-Related
Injury, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1345 (1999).
6. The Upjohn Company became the first drug manufacturer to engage in
nationwide direct-to-consumer advertising when it introduced its celebrated
anti-baldness product, Rogaine, to an eager public in 1989. See Michelle D.
Ehrlich, Doctors Can "Just Say No": The Constitutionality of Consumer-Directed
Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 535, 535
(1990); Barbara J. Tyler & Richard A. Cooper, Blinded by the Hype: Shifting the
Burden When Manufacturers Engage in Direct to Consumer Advertising of Pre-
scription Drugs, 21 VT. L. REV. 1073, 1073 (1997).
7. See Mae Joanne Rosok, Comment, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of
Prescription Drugs: After a Decade of Speculation, Courts Consider Another Ex-
ception to the Learned Intermediary Rule, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 629, 629 (2000)
(declaring that direct-to-consumer advertising "can effectively increase product
sales by reaching potential consumers through print and broadcast media").
8. Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the
Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 141 (1997).
9. Wayne L. Pines, A History and Perspective on Direct-to-Consumer Pro-
motion, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 489, 506-07 (1999).
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drugs are now being marketed in the same manner as any other
product."0 One means of increasing liability would be to abolish the
learned intermediary rule, either entirely or only in cases where the
manufacturer has engaged in direct-to-consumer advertising." An-
other route to enhanced liability is "negligent marketing." " This
theory would impose liability upon product manufacturers who ad-
vertised their products in such a way as to invite misuse by under-
age or psychologically vulnerable buyers or by criminals; it also
would subject manufacturers to liability for failure to control sales to
such consumers by careless or unscrupulous retailers.'3 However,
while these approaches merit some consideration, I conclude that
subjecting pharmaceutical companies to greater tort liability will
not necessarily benefit the consuming public.
Part II of this Article begins with a description of the statutory
regime under which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regu-
lates prescription drug labeling and advertising."' Part III examines
the various rationales that are commonly invoked to support the
learned intermediary rule. It also identifies some of the accepted
exceptions to the learned intermediary rule and considers whether
the courts should recognize a new exception in the case of direct-to-
consumer advertising. Part IV introduces the concept of negligent
marketing. It discusses the development of negligent marketing in
the context of handgun litigation and evaluates the application of
this concept in prescription drug litigation. Finally, Part V of the
Article argues that it is better to discourage unethical and danger-
ous marketing practices by industry self-regulation, or if necessary
by government regulation, than to create new, and potentially open-
ended, forms of tort liability.
II. FDA REGULATION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG LABELING
AND ADVERTISING
Unlike ordinary consumer goods, prescription drugs are heavily
regulated by the FDA. 5 As part of this statutory scheme, the FDA
10. See generally Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription
Drug Advertising and the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 FoOD DiUG COSM. L.J.
829, 848 (1991) (concluding that "[a] strong case can be made for recognizing an
exception to the learned intermediary rule when prescription drug manufactur-
ers engage in consumer-directed advertising").
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. Id.
14. See infra Part II.
15. Ann N. James, Comment, Warnings and the Pharmaceutical Compa.
nies: Legal Status of the Package Insert, 16 HoUSTON L. RE%,. 140, 143 (1978)
(declaring that virtually all phases of the manufacture and sale of pharmaceuti-
cal products are closely regulated by the FDA). For an overview of the FDA's
regulatory authority over pharmaceutical products, see Richard A. Merrill, The
Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REv.
1753, 1758-1835 (1996). The FDA's regulatory authority is derived from the
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oversees the labeling and the advertising of prescription drugs."
The FDA also regulates the labeling of all medical devices and the
advertising of "restricted" medical devices. 7 The FDA regulates the
labeling,18 though not the advertising, 9 of over-the-counter drugs as
well.2°
A. FDA Labeling Regulations
As part of its licensing process, the FDA requires the manufac-
turer of a new prescription drug to submit proposed labeling for ap-
proval.2 The reason the FDA reviews the proposed labeling is to en-
sure that it will provide the treating physician with all information
necessary to use the product safely and appropriately.2 Thus, the
FDA requires that such labeling contain dosage information, direc-
tions for safe use, conditions for which the drug is effective, contra-
indications, and warnings about known or suspected side effects or
adverse reactions.2
Once approved, this labeling must accompany the product in the
form of a package insert.24 FDA-approved labeling is also published
in the Physicians' Desk Reference, a book that is readily available to
physicians and other health care professionals.25 However, the
FDA's regulatory power over labeling is not limited to package in-
serts, but also extends to "any written material that supplements or
explains the product, is disseminated by the manufacturer, and
reaches the customer, doctor, or patient, either before, with, or after
the product."26 Thus, written materials, such as "brochures, detail
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (2000), and
the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 247b, 262 (2000).
16. 21 C.F.R. pt. 201 (2001) (labeling); id. pt. 202 (2001) (advertising).
17. 21 U.S.C. §§ 352, 352(r) (1994). Restricted medical devices are products
whose sale is restricted in some way by the FDA. See Nancy K. Plant, Prescrip-
tion Drug Promotion on the Internet: Tool for the Inquisitive or Trap for the Un-
wary?, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 89, 91 n.14 (1998).
18. 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(a), (n).
19. The Federal Trade Commission is responsible for overseeing the adver-
tising of over-the-counter products. 15 U.S.C. § 52 (2000).
20. Plant, supra note 17, at 91 n.14.
21. Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administration
Regulation and Products Liability: Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INS.
L.J. 194, 211-12 (1987).
22. Id. This information is ordinarily directed at the prescribing physician
and not the patient. See Charles J. Walsh et al., The Learned Intermediary
Doctrine: The Correct Prescription for Drug Labeling, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 821,
827-28 (1994).
23. James, supra note 15, at 301.
24. 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(d) (2001).
25. Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 21, at 212.
26. Edward M. Basile et al., Medical Device Labeling and Advertising: An
Overview, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 519, 519 (1999); see United States v. 47 Bottles,




aids, promotional mailings, posters, 'Dear Doctor' letters and scien-
tific journal articles" distributed by pharmaceutical companies are
all included within the definition of labeling."
Manufacturers whose labeling fails to meet FDA requirements
risk both criminal and civil liability. A product will be considered
misbranded if the manufacturer fails to comply with the FDA's la-
beling requirements, thereby subjecting the manufacturer to crimi-
nal sanctions.2 In addition, most courts will treat a violation of
FDA labeling regulations as negligence per se' in any civil action
brought against a manufacturer by an injured consumer.' Unfortu-
nately, for drug manufacturers, in most cases, compliance with FDA
labeling requirements will not necessarily protect them against tort
liability based on inadequate warnings.1
B. FDA Regulation of Advertising and Promotion
Since 1963,32 the FDA has also regulated advertising for pre-
27. Basile, supra note 26, at 519.
28. See Pennington Parker Landen, Federal Preemption and the Drug In-
dustry: Can Courts Co-Regulate?, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 85, 104 (1988).
29. When the legislature has established a mandatory standard of conduct
in a criminal statute, many courts apply the doctrine of negligence per se in
civil cases. Under this principle, the statutory standard establishes the stan-
dard of care for negligence so that violation of that standard conclusively estab-
lishes that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care. See Carter v. Wil-
liam Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. 1979) (observing that
"tnlegligence per se is a tort concept whereby a legislatively imposed standard of
conduct is adopted by the civil courts as defining the conduct of a reasonably
prudent person"); see also Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong" Regula-
tory Compliance Defense, 55 MD. L. REv. 1210, 1239-41 (1996) (discussing the
concept of negligence per se and the effect of noncompliance with statutory re-
quirements).
30. See Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455, 461 (4th Cir. 1960)
(treating surgical nail manufacturer's violation of FDA labeling requirements as
negligence per se); Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961, 964-
65 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (suggesting that failure to comply with FDA warning re-
quirements for oral contraceptives might be negligence per se).
31. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658 (1st Cir. 1981);
Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir. 1975); Chambers v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 383 (D. Md. 1975), af'd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th
Cir. 1977); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973); Ortho
Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Feldman
v. Lederle Labs., 592 A.2d 1176, 1197 (N.J. 1991); McEwen v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 534-35 (Or. 1974); Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Gonzales, 561
S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978).
There is an exception to this rule in the case of certain medical devices
where tort claims based on failure to warn are expressly preempted. See Meyer
v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 288, 293 (D.N.J. 1988); Lavetter v. Int'l Play-
tex, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 722, 723 (D. Ariz. 1988); Rinehart v. Int'l Playtex, Inc.,
688 F. Supp. 475, 477 (S.D. Ind. 1988); Edmondson v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 678 F.
Supp. 1571, 1571 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Stewart v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 672 F. Supp.
907, 909 (D.S.C. 1987).
32. Noah, supra note 8, at 142 (noting that the FDA first promulgated
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scription drugs33 and restricted medical devices. 34 The term, "adver-
tising," includes "advertisements in published journals, magazines,
other periodicals, and newspapers, and advertisements broadcast
through media such as radio, television, and telephone communica-
tions systems."35 FDA regulations provide that advertisements must
be "fairly balanced" and must not promote unapproved uses, omit
material information, or make comparative claims about another
product unless these claims are supported by substantial evidence
from two well-controlled clinical trials.36
Prescription drug manufacturers must include a "brief sum-
mary" of the package insert in all advertisements which discuss a
drug's effectiveness or identify indications for use." This brief
summary must describe side effects, contraindications, warnings,
and indications for use, but need not provide the sort of dosage and
pharmacological information that is typically required by the FDA
for product labeling.3" When manufacturers advertise to doctors and
other health care professionals, they usually include relevant por-
tions of the physician package insert in the advertisement." The
brief summary in direct-to-consumer advertisements may be similar
to that contained in advertisements directed at health care profes-
sionals or it may be written in more simple lay language." Adver-
tisements that identify a product by name and state that the prod-
uct is suitable for a specific condition or purpose must satisfy the
brief summary requirement;" however, so-called reminder and help-
seeking advertisements do not have to contain a brief summary."
In the case of print advertising, drug companies may comply
with the FDA's brief summary requirement by reproducing the text
of the package insert in the advertisement. 43 However, satisfying
the brief summary requirement is much more difficult for broadcast
advertisers. For this reason, when pharmaceutical companies first
began to advertise on radio and television in the mid-1980s, they
confined themselves to help-seeking and reminder advertisements,
which were exempt from the brief summary requirements. Rogaine
advertisements of this period, which suggested that products were
available to prevent hair loss but did not identify any of these prod-
ucts by name, exemplified the help-seeking variety of advertise-
regulations with respect to prescription drug advertising in 1963).
33. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (1994).
34. Id. § 352(q), (r).
35. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(1) (2001).
36. Id. § 202.1(e)(5)(ii), (6)(i)-(v).
37. Id. § 202.1(e)(1).
38. Id. § 202.1(e)(3)(i)-(iii).
39. See Plant, supra note 17, at 101.
40. Id.
41. Id.; 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (2001).
42. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(2)(i)-(iii) (2001).
43. Noah, supra note 8, at 149.
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ment. The "blue skies" Claritin advertisements of the early 1990s,
which mentioned the product by name but failed to mention its me-
dicinal purpose, exemplified the reminder type of advertisement."'
Beginning in 1997, the FDA began to relax the brief summary
requirement for radio and television advertisements. '5 Under cur-
rent regulatory guidelines, which were promulgated in 1999,'" drug
manufacturers do not have to provide a brief summary on the air,
but may simply identify the product's major side effects and contra-
indications in lay language during the broadcast.' 7 In such cases,
however, the manufacturer must comply with an "adequate provi-
sion" requirement.' s This imposes a duty on the drug manufacturer
to disseminate the contents of the approved package label to con-
sumers by: (1) providing a toll-free telephone number where such in-
formation can be requested; (2) referring in the broadcast adver-
tisement to a print advertisement or brochures available to the
public which contain such information; (3) advising listeners or
viewers to ask a pharmacist or doctor for further information about
the product; and (4) providing an Internet web site where such in-
formation can be obtained.49
Recently, the FDA has turned its attention to advertising by
drug companies on the Internet.0 The FDA traditionally main-
tained that information published on the Internet was a form of
product labeling and could be regulated on this basis.' Now, how-
ever, the FDA is attempting to develop guidelines to deal with the
specialized problems of Internet advertising.5'
III. LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO WARN ULTIMATE CONSUMERS
Sellers are usually required to provide adequate warnings and
44. Pines, supra note 9, at 494.
45. In August 1997, the FDA published "Draft Guidance" that allowed drug
companies to make 'adequate provision" for dissemination of the "brief sum-
mary" outside the broadcast itself See FDA, Draft Guidance for Industry; Con-
sumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements; Availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,171
(1997). This encouraged drug companies to increase advertisements for pre-
scription products on television. See Pines, supra note 9, at 497.
46. In 1999, the FDA issued a "Final Guidance" on television advertising
that spelled out in detail how drug companies could satisfy the "adequate provi-
sion" requirement in their radio and television advertising. See FDA, Guidance
for Industry. Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements (Aug. 1999) avail-
able at http'//www.fda.gov/cder/guidancelindex.htm.
47. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (2001).
48. Marilyn A. Moberg et al., Surfing the Net in Shallow Waters: Product
Liability Concerns and Advertising on the Internet, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 213,
216-17 (1998).
49. Kelly N. Reeves, Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertising: Empower-
ing the Consumer or Manipulating a Vulnerable Population?, 53 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 661, 674 (1998).
50. Noah, supra note 8, at 153-55.
51. Basile, supra note 26, at 530.
52. Pines, supra note 9, at 513-14.
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instructions to the ultimate users or consumers of their products.
However, under the learned intermediary rule, the sellers of pre-
scription drugs may satisfy their duty to warn by communicating
with prescribing physicians and need not attempt to reach consum-
ers. Now that the nature of the physician-patient relationship is
changing, it has been suggested that the learned intermediary rule
should be done away with, thereby subjecting prescription drug
manufacturers to a duty to warn patients as well as doctors.
A. The Seller's General Duty to Warn
Manufacturers 3 and others in the distributive chain54 normally
have a duty to provide adequate warnings and instructions to fore-
seeable users and consumers of their products.55 According to the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, a product may be considered defective
when "the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions
or warnings by the seller or other distributor ... and the omission of
the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably
safe."56
Even if the manufacturer provides a warning, it may still be
subject to liability if the court concludes that the warning provided
was inadequate. An adequate warning is one that is reasonable un-
der the circumstances.5" This usually involves a number of factors.
53. Dix W. Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or
Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 281 (1969) ("The duty to warn runs to those the
manufacturer should expect to use the chattel, or be endangered by its probable
use, and the warning must be reasonably calculated to reach such persons, di-
rectly or indirectly.").
54. M. Stuart Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours
and Criticism, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 221, 279 (1987) ("Liability for failure to pro-
vide adequate warnings may be imposed upon all entities within the chain of
distribution, including not only manufacturers, but suppliers, wholesalers, dis-
tributors and retailers as well.").
55. Product sellers also may be held liable for failing to provide proper di-
rections or instructions. See, e.g., Edwards v. Cal. Chem. Co., 245 So. 2d 259,
265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (instructions on insecticide found to be inadequate
because they did not advise customers to wear respirator and protective cloth-
ing while using product); Tompkins v. Log Sys., Inc., 385 S.E.2d 545, 547-48
(N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (reasonable person could conclude that instructions in-
cluded in pre-packaged kits for construction of log homes were inadequate be-
cause they failed to explain how to make sure that building walls were plumb).
In theory, warnings and instructions serve different purposes: warnings provide
users or consumers with information about product-related risks, while instruc-
tions demonstrate how to use the product properly and safely. See Victor E.
Schwartz & Russell W. Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: The Need for a Syn-
thesis of Law and Communication Theory, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 38, 51-52 (1983).
Nevertheless, courts and commentators often use the term "warning" to include
both warnings and instructions.
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998).
57. Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981) ("An
adequate warning is one reasonable under the circumstances."); Graham v.
[Vol. 37104
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First, a warning must provide information about all significant risks
associated with the product's use' and must reveal the actual likeli-
hood and gravity of such risks when they are known by the manu-
facturer. 9 Second, a warning will be considered inadequate if its
print size is too small to be noticed by the user' or if the warning is
not placed in a prominent position on the label.' Third, a warning
must be phrased with a degree of intensity that is commensurate
with the danger,2 and must not be ambiguous, equivocal, or contra-
dictory.' Fourth, an effective warning must be easily understood by
its intended audience; ' a warning that uses technical language not
Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1498 (D. Kan. 1987) ("An adequate warning is
one that is reasonable under the circumstances."); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v.
Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) ("To be adequate, a warning
must be reasonable under the circumstances.").
58. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 939 F.2d 1293, 1300 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Because
the principal purpose of the warning is to permit the user to make an informed
decision whether to expose himself to the risks of the product, however, a manu-
facturer or distributor 'fulfills its duty to warn in this context only if it warns of
all dangers associated with its products of which it has actual or constructive
knowledge.") (quoting Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314,
1320 (5th Cir. 1985)); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.
1980) ("The manufacturer's duty is to warn of all potential dangers which it
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, to exist.");
Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 350, 353 (D. Kan. 1990) ("The manu-
facturer's duty is to warn of all potential dangers which it knew, or in the exer-
cise of reasonable care should have known, to exist.").
59. See Martinkovic v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (warning provided to prescribing physician of DTP vaccine could be con-
sidered inadequate because it characterized risk of convulsions as "exceedingly
rare," when some studies showed the risk to be as high as one in 1,750).
60. See Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238, 243 (4th Cir. 1971) (warning
about flammability of hair rollers held to be inadequate because it was in the
same print size as other material on the product's label); Spruill v. Boyle-
Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 86 (4th Cir. 1962) (warning on furniture polish found
to be inadequate because print was too small to attract attention of users).
6L See D'Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 310 A.2d 106, 111 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1973) (jury issue presented as to adequacy of warning that placed informa-
tion about risk of allergic reaction to hair dye at the end of instructions on how
to apply patch test).
62. Lars Noah, Constraints on the Off-Label Uses of Prescription Drug
Products, 16 J. PRODS. & TOXICS LIAB. 139, 152 (1994); see also Salmon v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975); Martinkovic v. Wyeth Labs.,
Inc., 669 F. Supp. 212, 215 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 390
N.E.2d 1214, 1230 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979); Richards v. Upjohn Co., 625 P.2d 1192,
1196 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 837
(Ohio 1981).
63. See James B. Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct for Safe Use in
Strict Tort Liability, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 521, 551-52 (1982); see also Salmon, 520
F.2d at 1363; Martinkovic, 669 F. Supp. at 215; Mahr, 390 N.E.2d at 1230;
Richards, 625 P.2d at 1196; Seley, 423 N.E.2d at 837.
64. Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1345-46 (9th Cir.
1981) ("An important factor in evaluating the adequacy of a warning is the clar-
ity of the warning."); Schwartz & Driver, supra note 55, at 61.
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easily understood by members of the general public may not be ade-
quate.65 Finally, an otherwise acceptable warning may be found in-
adequate if it has not been communicated through the most effective
channels.66
B. The Learned Intermediary Rule
In most cases, the manufacturer of a prescription drug is only
required to warn a patient's prescribing physician, and once an ade-
quate warning is given to the physician, the drug manufacturer is
relieved of any duty to warn the patient directly. 7 The exception to
65. See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 71-72 (Mass.
1985) (warning that oral contraceptive might cause "cerebral thrombosis" did
not adequately communicate the risk of a stroke to users). In addition, some
courts have concluded that warnings printed solely in English may not be suffi-
cient if they failed to use pictograms or Spanish when the expected users of the
product were known to be incapable of understanding a warning written in
English. See Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 405 (1st Cir.
1965) ("IT]he jury could reasonably have believed that defendant should have
foreseen that its admittedly dangerous product would be used by, among others,
persons like plaintiffs' intestates, who were farm laborers, of limited education
and reading ability, and that a warning... would not, because of its lack of a
skull and bones or other comparable symbols or hieroglyphics, be 'adequate."');
Stanley Indus., Inc. v. W.M. Barr & Co., 784 F. Supp. 1570, 1576 (S.D. Fla.
1992) ("In light of the defendants' joint advertising in Miami's Hispanic media
and the nature of the product, this court likewise finds that it is for the jury to
decide whether the defendant could have reasonably foreseen that the boiled
linseed oil would be used by persons such as Gallery's Nicaraguan, Spanish-
Speaking unskilled laborers."); Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 485
A.2d 305, 310 (N.J. 1984) ("In view of the unskilled or semi-skilled nature of the
work and the existence of many in the work force who do not read English,
warnings in the form of symbols might have been appropriate."). But see Rami-
rez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 177 (Cal. 1993) ("To preserve ... uniformity
and clarity, to avoid adverse impacts upon the warning requirements mandated
by the federal regulatory scheme, and in deference to the superior technical and
procedural lawmaking resources of legislative and administrative bodies, we
adopt the legislative/regulatory standard of care that mandates nonprescription
drug package warnings in English only."); Thomas v. Clairol, Inc., 583 So. 2d
108, 110-11 (La. Ct. App. 1991) ("[Pllaintiff... had the burden to show the use
[of the defendant's hair dye product] was sufficient (among illiterate consumersl
that defendant should have foreseen it and provided additional warnings or
other safety precautions.").
66. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 991-92 (4th Cir. 1975)
(failure to use sales representatives to warn physicians about risk of vision loss
from the use of Aralen rendered warning ineffective); Yarrow v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D.S.D. 1967), affd, 408 F.2d 978, 990 (8th Cir.
1969); Richards v. Upjohn Co., 625 P.2d 1192, 1196 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (hold-
ing that a jury might conclude that changing contraindication for neomycin in
package inserts and Physicians' Desk Reference might not be sufficient to com-
municate newly discovered danger of using antibiotic to irrigate open wounds
when this use had been recommended for more than ten years).
67. Yonni D. Fushman, Comment, Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc.: Toward Cre-
ating a Direct-to-Consumer Advertisement Exception to the Learned Intermedi.
ary Doctrine, 80 B.U. L. REv. 1161, 1162 (2000).
[Vol. 37
AGGRESSIVE MARKETING
the general duty under products liability law to warn the ultimate
consumer is known as the learned intermediary rule because the
physician is expected to act as an intermediary between the manu-
facturer and the patient.' Although the learned intermediary rule
first arose in connection with prescription drug cases, 9 courts now
routinely apply it to cases involving medical implants"0 and medical
devices as well. 1
When the learned intermediary rule applies, a manufacturer
may transmit a warning to a physician by means of a package in-
sert, by placing information about the product in the Physicians'
Desk Reference, by advertising in medical journals, by sending let-
ters directly to physicians, or by personal visits to physicians' offices
by company sales representatives. 2 The legal sufficiency of a par-
ticular method of communication will depend on the circumstances.
A pharmaceutical company's duty to warn is continuous; therefore,
the manufacturer must notify the medical community of any risks or
68. Reaves v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (E.D. Mich.
1991); West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Ark. 1991); Felix v. Hoffman-
LaRoche, Inc., 540 So. 2d 102, 104 (Fla. 1989); Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 933
P.2d 298, 300 (Okla. 1997); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 978
(Wash. 1978).
69. See, e.g., Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 811 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2304 (1992) (Accutane acne medicine); Anderson v.
McNeilab, Inc., 831 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1987) (Zomax sinus remedy); Plummer
v. Lederle Labs., 819 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987)
(Orimune oral polio vaccine); Swayze v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 469
(5th Cir. 1987) (fentanyl narcotic anesthetic); Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341,
1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (Sabin oral polio vaccine); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish,
370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966) (Aralen anti-arthritis medication); Tracy v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 878 (Ohio 1991) (Nicorette anti-
smoking treatment); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 836 (Ohio
1981) (Ovulen oral contraceptives).
70. See Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89, 95 (D. Md. 1989),
affid, 898 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1990) (silicone gel breast implants); Desmarais v.
Dow Corning Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 17-18 (D. Conn. 1989) (silicone gel breast
implants); Padgett v. Synthes, Ltd., 677 F. Supp. 1329, 1335 (W.D.N.C. 1988)
(compression plate attached to tibia bone); Perfetti v. McGhan Med., 662 P.2d
646, 650 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 662 P.2d 645 (N.M. 1983) (silicone gel
breast implants).
71. See Willett v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 929 F.2d 1094, 1098 (5th Cir. 1991) (ar-
tificial heart valve); Phelps v. Sherwood Med. Indus., 836 F.2d 296, 303 (7th
Cir. 1987) (heart catheter); Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th
Cir. 1984) (cardiac pacemaker).
72. Smith v. E.R. Squibb, 273 N.W.2d 476, 478-79 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979);
Thompson, supra note 2, at 144.
73. See Wyeth Labs., Inc. v. Fortenberry, 530 So. 2d 688, 692-93 (Miss.
1988) (warning about routine risks communicated by means of package insert
held to be adequate as a matter of law). But see Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
263 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D.S.D. 1967), affd, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969} (holding
that manufacturer should have used sales representatives to communicate
warning to physicians).
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side effects that are discovered after the product is first marketed. 4
However, once the manufacturer informs the physician about drug-
related risks, the burden shifts to the physician to disclose this in-
formation to the patient.75 On the other hand, a prescription product
will be regarded as defective if the manufacturer fails to provide an
effective warning to the prescribing physician. Moreover, the pa-
tient has a direct cause of action against the manufacturer for any
injuries that occur as the result of this breach of duty.77
1. Rationales for the Learned Intermediary Rule
Over the years, courts and commentators have offered a variety
of rationales in support of the learned intermediary rule. One justi-
fication for the rule rests on the nature of the physician-patient rela-
tionship. 8 It is assumed that the physician is primarily responsible
for deciding what drugs to prescribe, while the patient plays a rela-
tively passive role in the decision-making process. 9 Because the
physician is medically trained and the patient is not, in most cases,
the patient must rely on the physician to choose the most appropri-
ate treatment.0 Consequently, warnings are best directed at the
74. Beyette v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 823 F.2d 990, 992 (6th Cir. 1987); Lind-
say v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980); Stanback v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 502 F. Supp. 767, 770 (W.D. Va. 1980), affd, 657 F.2d 642 (4th Cir.
1981).
75. Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984) ("Once
adequate warnings are given to the physician, the choice of treatment and the
duty to disclose properly fall on the doctor."); Rosok, supra note 7, at 634-35.
The physician's duty to warn his or her patients is derived from the doctrine of
informed consent. See Alan R. Sykes, Note, Prescription Drugs and the Duty to
Warn: An Argument for Patient Package Inserts, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 111, 121
(1991).
76. Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 390 N.E. 2d 1214, 1228 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)
(pointing out that "a prescription drug may be deemed unreasonably dangerous
if it is manufactured and distributed without adequate warnings of possible ad-
verse reactions").
77. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 1970);
Wooderson v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1050 (Kan. 1984); McEwen v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974); Paytash, supra note 5, at
1346.
78. Lloyd C. Chatfield II, Note, Medical Implant Litigation and Failure to
Warn: A New Extension for the Learned Intermediary Rule?, 82 KY. L.J. 575,
584-85 (1993-94) (pointing out that "the nature of the physician-patient rela-
tionship forms the foundation of the learned intermediary rule").
79. Nancy K. Plant, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Some New Medi-
cine for an Old Ailment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1014 (1996) (stating that
"[clourts that apply the [learned intermediary] doctrine assume that the physi-
cian is the primary decisionmaker regarding whether a particular patient
should use a particular prescription drug").
80. West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Ark. 1991) (stating that "the
patient relies upon the physician's judgment in selecting the drug, and the pa-
tient relies upon the physician's advice in using the drug"); Seley v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 423 N.E. 2d 831, 840 (Ohio 1981) (observing that "[tihe patient is ex-
pected to place primary reliance upon the physician's judgment, and to follow
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physician rather than at the patient.
Another rationale for the learned intermediary doctrine as-
sumes that prescription drugs are complicated and that treatment
choices must be based on an individualized assessment of the pa-
tient's particular physical condition. 8' In the words of one court,
"[pirescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in
formula and varied in effect. As a medical expert, the prescribing
physician can take into account the propensities of the drug as well
as the susceptibilities of [the] patient."12 Thus, the individualized
nature of the treatment process strongly indicates that information
about prescription drugs can best be utilized more effectively by
physicians than by patients.
The learned intermediary rule may also be justified on the the-
ory that warnings communicated directly to patients by pharmaceu-
tical companies might actually be harmful instead of beneficial to
their health.' Specifically, if information about particular drugs
were not screened and interpreted by their doctors, it is feared that
some patients might overreact to consumer-oriented warnings and
fail to seek proper medical treatment.8
Another rationale for the learned intermediary rule rests on
more practical considerations. Drug manufacturers traditionally
have transmitted warnings and other information to patients by
means of a package insert. However, unlike over-the-counter
products, prescription drugs are normally shipped in bulk packages
to pharmacies, who repackage them for sale to individual custom-
ers.8" For this reason, it would be difficult for warnings from manu-
facturers to reach ultimate consumers of their products.' Further-
his advice and instructions as to the use of the drug"); McKee v. Moore, 648
P.2d 21, 24-25 (Okla. 1982) (declaring that "Itihe patient is expected to and, it
can be presumed, does place primary reliance upon [the physician's] judgment").
81. Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1031-32 (D.N.J.
1988) (stating that "[blecause prescription drugs are often complex in formula
and effect, the physician is in the best position to take into account the propen-
sities of the drug and the susceptibilities of the patient, and to give a highly in-
dividualized warning to the ultimate user based on the physician's specialized
knowledge").
82. Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974).
83. Susan A. Casey, Comment, Laying an Old Doctrine to Rest: Challenging
the Wisdom of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REv.
931, 948 (1993).
84. Plant, supra note 79, at 1015.
85. Chester Chuang, Note, Is There a Doctor in the House? Using Failure-
to-Warn Liability to Enhance the Safety of Online Prescribing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1452, 1467 (2000).
86. Tyler & Cooper, supra note 6, at 1083.
87. Basko v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969) (observ-
ing that "it is difficult under such circumstances for the manufacturer, by label
or direct communication, to reach the consumer with a warning") (quoting
Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968)); West v. Searle &
Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Ark. 1991) (declaring that "it is virtually impossible
20021
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
more, it would be virtually impossible for manufacturers to produce
warnings in lay language that would adequately inform patients of
risks that are often varied and related to the physical condition of
individual patients.88 Physicians, on the other hand, can tailor these
warnings to fit the needs of individual patients. 89
Finally, requiring drug manufacturers to warn ultimate con-
sumers directly might undermine the physician-patient relation-
ship." As one court observed: "The physician-patient relationship is
a fiduciary one based on trust and confidence and obligating the
physician to exercise good faith. As a part of this relationship, both
parties envision that the patient will rely on the judgment and ex-
pertise of the physician."9" Arguably, this relationship would be se-
riously compromised if the patient relied upon information from
sources other than his or her personal physician.
2. Exceptions to the Learned Intermediary Rule
The learned intermediary rule assumes the existence of a physi-
cian-patient relationship under which information and advice can be
efficiently transmitted from the physician to the patient. Conse-
quently, the courts have been reluctant to apply the rule in situa-
tions where there is no physician-patient relationship, where such a
relationship is greatly attenuated, or where the patient plays a ma-
92jor role in the medical decision-making process. 2 As a result, a
number of recognized exceptions to the learned intermediary rule
have evolved over the years.9'
in many cases for a manufacturer to directly warn each patient").
88. Paytash, supra note 5, at 1347.
89. Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1305 (D. Minn. 1988)
(pointing out that "the physician, as the prescriber of the drug, is in the best po-
sition to give a highly individualized warning to a patient based on the physi-
cian's knowledge of the patient and the inherent risks of the drug"); Terhune v.
A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 978 (Wash. 1978) (observing that "[tihe physi-
cian decides what facts should be told to the patient").
90. See Swayze v. McNeil Labs, Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1987) (de-
claring that "[w]hen the physician-patient relationship does exist, as here, we
hesitate to encourage, much less require, a drug manufacturer to intervene in
it"); Dunkin v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) (ob-
serving that "attempts to give detailed warnings to patients.. . might also tend
to interfere with the physician/patient relationship"); West v. Searle & Co., 806
S.W.2d 608, 613 (Ark. 1991) (stating that "imposition of a duty to warn the user
directly would interfere with the relationship between the doctor and the pa-
tient").
91. Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ohio 1991)
(citations omitted).
92. Plant, supra note 79, at 1016 (noting that "[clourts have not allowed
manufacturers to invoke the Learned Intermediary doctrine in situations in
which.., no true physician-intermediary relationship exists and those in which
the patient exercises an unusually significant role in determining whether the
drug is an appropriate treatment").
93. See Casey, supra note 83, at 939-47; Schwartz, supra note 10, at 832-34.
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The first exception applies to cases where a patient receives a
vaccine administered as part of a mass immunization program.9
Since there is rarely any contact between physicians and patients in
such programs, it is felt that direct warnings are necessary to allow
patients to make informed choices about the risks and benefits of
immunization.95 The learned intermediary rule has also been re-
jected in several cases where a vaccine was given in a doctor's office
when the court concluded that the plaintiffs physician had not made
any individualized balancing of risks and benefits before administer-
96ing the vaccine.
A second exception involves oral contraceptives."' A few courts
have excluded these drugs from the reach of the learned intermedi-
ary rule,9" reasoning that patients participate more actively in deci-
sions about contraceptive practices than in other types of medical
treatment. 99 These courts also contend that manufacturers of oral
contraceptives should be required to provide information about their
products to patients directly because users of oral contraceptives do
not always maintain an ongoing professional relationship with their
doctors and, hence, do not rely upon them for information." It
should be pointed out that most courts continue to apply the learned
intermediary rule even to oral contraceptives.' °' In their view, it is
appropriate to apply the learned intermediary rule in such cases be-
cause most patients do rely on their physicians for advice about
94. Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1440 (8th Cir. 1984) (swine flu
vaccine administered in mass immunization program); Reyes v. Wyeth Labs.,
498 F.2d 1264, 1269 (5th Cir.) (polio vaccine administered through mass immu-
nization program), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Davis v. Wyeth Labs.,
Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 122 (9th Cir. 1968) (same); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer &
Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Okla. 1975) (same).
95. See Williams v. Lederle Labs., 591 F. Supp. 381, 389 (S.D. Ohio 1984)
(declaring that a direct warning to the patient was required if "the vaccine is
typically administered without the individualized balancing that underlies the
learned intermediary rule").
96. Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977); Williams v. Led-
erle Labs., 591 F. Supp. 381, 389 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Samuels v. American Cy-
anamid Co., 495 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1008 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
97. Chatfield, supra note 78, at 594-602.
98. Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867, 878 (E.D. Mich. 1985);
Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379, 381 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Mac-
Donald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 68 (Mass.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
920 (1985).
99. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Mass.), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
100. Id.
101. See Reaves v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1290-91 (E.D.
Mich. 1991); Goodson v. Searle Labs., 471 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D. Conn. 1978);
West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 614 (Ark. 1991); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v.
Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Cobb v. Syntex Labs., Inc.,
444 So. 2d 203, 205 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Taurino v. Ellen, 579 A.2d 925, 928 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990).
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birth control.
10 2
A third exception has been recognized for intrauterine devices
(IUDs). A federal appeals court in Hill v. Searle Laboratories10 3 held
that IUDs, like other birth control devices, were "atypical from most
prescription drug products because the treating physician generally
does not make an intervening, individualized medical judgment in
the birth control decision.""°4 The court offered several reasons for
this conclusion. First, the patient, not the physician, makes the de-
cision to practice birth control, and the reasons for this decision are
often not medical in nature.0 5 Second, once the IUD is inserted,
there may be little subsequent contact between the physician and
the patient.' 6 Finally, IUDs and other birth control devices are of-
ten given in clinic-type conditions where there is little personal con-
tact between the patient and the physician who oversees the proce-
dure.0 7 Notwithstanding the Hill decision, however, most courts
have concluded that the learned intermediary rule does apply to
IUD cases."0 ' According to these courts, even though the patient
may choose which form of contraception to use, her doctor still re-
tains significant control over the decision-making process: not only
does the physician describe the various options that are available to
the patient, but he or she also fits the IUD in place.' 9
Finally, a possible exception to the learned intermediary rule
may be available when the FDA requires manufacturers to provide
patient package inserts for the benefit of ultimate users of the prod-
uct. ° FDA regulations mandate the use of patient package inserts
for oral contraceptives."' These regulations provide that the manu-
facturer must furnish information about such matters as contraindi-
cations, potential side effects or adverse reactions, precautions that
patients should take, and instructions for safe use."2 Package in-
serts are also required for IUDs.' and certain other medical prod-
102. West, 806 S.W.2d at 614; Taurino, 579 A.2d at 928.
103. 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
104. Id. at 1070.
105. Id. at 1071.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Odum v. G.D. Searle & Co., 979 F.2d 1001, 1003 (4th Cir. 1992); Al-
len v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1148 (D. Or. 1989); Spychala v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1032 (D.N.J. 1988); Kociemba v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1305-06 (D. Minn. 1988); Lacy v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 567 A.2d 398, 401 (Del. 1989); Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032, 1042-43
(Kan. 1990); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 979 (Wash. 1978).
109. Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398, 401 (Del. 1989) (declaring that
'not only must the physician order the IUD for his patient, but the physician
must also fit the IUD in place. Thus, the patient is required to rely on her phy-
sician's expertise whenever an IUD is used.").
110. Fushman, supra note 67, at 1167-68.
111. 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (2000).
112. Id. § 310.501(c).
113. Id. § 310.502; id. § 801.427.
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ucts as well.' A few courts have taken the position that the learned
intermediary rule serves no purpose when the FDA requires the
manufacturer to communicate directly with the patient by means of
package inserts."' However, most courts that have considered the
issue have concluded that the learned intermediary rule should not
be displaced by FDA package insert requirements.' 6
C. Should There Be a Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Exception to
the Learned Intermediary Rule?
Some legal commentators believe that the learned intermediary
rule has outlived its usefulness.' 7 They contend that the rule is in-
consistent with the modern doctrine of informed consent' and that
it does not reflect the fact that patients have a more important role
in health care decision-making than they did in the past."9 These
critics also claim that traditional physician-patient relationships are
increasingly uncommon in today's health care environment.'"'
Nevertheless, the learned intermediary rule continues to be
114. See, e.g., id. § 310.515 (requiring package inserts for estrogen).
115. Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961, 965 (E.D. Wis.
1981) (concluding that:
[slince 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 was enacted to protect persons like the
plaintiff from the harmful side effects associated with oral contracep-
lives by warning them of such effects so as to enable them to recognize
them and to seek qualified medical assistance,... the defendant in
this case did have a duty to warn the plaintiff Helen Anne Lukasze-
wicz of the possible side effects of Ortho-Novum);
Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 933 P.2d 298, 301 (Okla. 1997) (declaring that
"[wihen direct warnings to the user of a prescription drug have been mandated
by a safety regulation promulgated for the protection of the user, an exception
to the learned intermediary doctrine exists").
116. See In re Norplant Contraceptive Prod. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 379-
80 (5th Cir. 1999); MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 775 F. Supp. 417, 424-25
(D.D.C. 1991); Zanzuri v. G.D. Searle & Co., 748 F. Supp. 1511, 1516 (S.D. Fla.
1990); Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1033 (D.N.J. 1988);
Martin v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 356-57 (Ill. 1996).
117. Casey, supra note 83, at 957 ("[Tlhe learned intermediary doctrine...
is a concept that has outlived its erstwhile value.").
118. See Margaret Gilhooley, Learned Intermediaries, Prescription Drugs
and Patient Information, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 633, 657-58 (1986) ("The change
in the informed consent doctrine makes appropriate a corresponding change in
the role that the physician should perform as a 'learned intermediary.");
Thompson, supra note 2, at 146 ("By placing the warning into the hands of the
physician, who is given sole discretion to determine what risk, if any, will be
communicated to the patient, the current system of manufacturer warnings
perpetuates paternalism and aggravates the problem of informed consent.").
119. See Rosok, supra note 7, at 659 (observing that "Itihe practice of medi-
cine in the United States is less paternalistic than in the past because patient
involvement in health care decisions has increased"); Schwartz, supra note 10,
at 844 (arguing that "patients are adopting a stronger role in the doctor/patient
relationship").
120. See Chuang, supra note 85, at 1464 (contending that -[tloday's man-
aged care organizations often prevent patients from establishing long term rela-
tionships with physicians and usually provide patients with shorter consulta-
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ertheless, the learned intermediary rule continues to be recognized
by the vast majority of American courts.121 Moreover, the new Re-
statement of Torts has also endorsed the traditional learned inter-
mediary rule, 2 although not without dissent from some legal schol-
ars.
123
A number of commentators have called upon courts to recognize
an exception to the learned intermediary rule for prescription prod-
ucts that are advertised directly to consumers.' 24 For the most part,
the few courts that have addressed this issue have not shown much
enthusiasm for creating such an exception. However, a recent deci-
sion by the New Jersey Supreme Court, Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories,
Inc.,"' suggests that this may be about to change.
1. Prior Cases
Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 26 decided in 1985, was one of the
first cases to consider the potential effect of direct-to-consumer ad-
vertising on the learned intermediary rule. In that case, the court
was to decide whether the manufacturers of oral contraceptives
should lose the benefit of the learned intermediary rule because
their "zealous marketing practices" caused patients to request cer-
tain types of birth control pills and thereby minimized the physi-
cian's role in treatment decisions.12 ' Although the court declined to
recognize an exception for direct-to-consumer advertising in
Stephens, it did take the manufacturer's marketing practices into
account when it decided to exempt oral contraceptives from the
tions").
121. See Fushman, supra note 67, at 1164 n.19 (citing cases in thirty-seven
states that adopt this rule).
122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d)(1) (1998).
For a discussion of the learned intermediary rule and the Restatement (Third)
see Noah, supra note 8, at 161-68.
123. George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1132 (2000) (contending that
"none of the rationales set forth in the Restatement (Third) justifies the bifurca-
tion of products-liability law and the near-immunity from products liability
granted to makers of prescription drugs and other medical products").
124. Fushman, supra note 67, at 1183 (arguing that "[a] DTC advertising
exception [to the learned intermediary rule] makes sense"); Tyler & Cooper, su-
pra note 6, at 1095-96 (contending that "[slince the effect of DTC promotions
and advertisements is to bypass the learned intermediary, the court should be
receptive to an argument for another exception to this doctrine"). But see Noah,
supra note 8, at 180 (declaring that "no persuasive case exists for recognizing
an advertising exception [to the learned intermediary doctrine]"); Rosok, supra
note 7, at 660 (asserting that "[n]either case law precedent nor policy argu-
ments support the argument that direct-to-consumer advertising should create
an exception to the learned intermediary rule in drug liability actions").
125. 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).
126. 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich. 1985).




The question came up again in Hill v. Searle Laboratories."
The court in that case held that the manufacturer of CU-7 IUDs was
required to warn ultimate users because the manufacturer's
advertising did not give consumers a true picture of the risks
associated with using the defendant's product.'" The court in
another case, Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 3 declared that an
exception to the learned intermediary rule might be appropriate
when a drug manufacturer "bypasses the traditional patient-
physician relationship" by means of direct-to-consumer
advertising.3 ' However, since the defendant in that case had not
advertised to patients, the court's remarks in Garside were nothing
more than dictum.
More recently, In re Norplant Contraceptive Products
Litigation,' 3 decided by a federal appeals court in 1999, also refused
to recognize an exception for direct-to-consumer advertising. The
plaintiffs in Norplant alleged that they had all suffered side effects
from Norplant contraceptive devices.13 The plaintiffs argued that
the product's manufacturer should be held liable for failing to warn
them directly about the risks of side effects, while the manufacturer
insisted that it was only obligated to warn the plaintiffs'
physicians. ' ' The trial court agreed with the defendant's position
and granted a motion for summary judgment in its favor.'" On
appeal, the plaintiffs contended, inter alia, that the manufacturer
had engaged in "aggressive" marketing and, therefore, should be
held liable for not providing adequate information about the
product's side effects as part of these marketing efforts.' 3
The appeals court rejected this argument because the plaintiffs
were unable to prove that they had seen or relied on any of the
defendant's advertising or promotional materials." Therefore,
according to the court, the product manufacturer was entitled to
summary judgment even if the court recognized the existence of an
exception to the learned intermediary rule when the manufacturer
had engaged in direct-to-consumer advertising.3" Furthermore, the
court concluded that Texas law, which was applicable in this case,
128. Fushman, supra note 67, at 1169.
129. 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
130. Id. at 1070.
131. 764 F. Supp. 208 (D. Mass. 1991), rev'd, 976 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1992).
132. Id. at 211 n.4.
133. 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999).
134. Id. at 376. The Norplant device is designed to provide long-term birth
control protection. It consists of six containers of a hormone, progestin, which
are inserted in the patient's upper arm just below the skin. Id.
135. Id. at 376-77.
136. Id.
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would apply the learned intermediary rule, even where a
manufacturer employed direct-to-consumer advertising, as long as a
physician-patient relationship existed between the victim and her
physician.14 Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment for the defendant.'
2. Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.
The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a different view on this
issue in Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.14 The plaintiffs in this
case alleged that the American distributors of Norplant had failed to
provide adequate warnings about various side effects associated
with the contraceptive device.14 After cases involving approxi-
mately fifty New Jersey plaintiffs were consolidated in one court,
five "bellweather" plaintiffs14 were selected to litigate the issue of
whether the defendant's duty to warn the ultimate users of the Nor-
plant device was limited by the learned intermediary rule.4  The
trial court held that the learned intermediary rule was applicable
and dismissed the plaintiffs' case. 146  The intermediate appellate
court, relying in part on the Restatement (Third) of Torts4 and in
part on a state statute, 48 affirmed the trial court's decision."'
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that sell-
ers of prescription drugs who make direct claims to consumers about
the efficacy of their products cannot satisfy their duty to warn
merely by providing information to physicians. 5 ° The court noted
that the defendant had begun a massive marketing campaign for the
Norplant device in 1991, advertising extensively on television and in
140. Id. The court cited Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories, 863 F.2d 1173, 1178
(5th Cir. 1988), and Swayze v. McNeil Laboratories, 807 F.2d 464 (5th Cir.
1987), as authority for this proposition.
141. 165 F.3d at 379-80.
142. 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).
143. Id. at 1248. These side effects included "weight gain, headaches, dizzi-
ness, nausea, diarrhea, acne, vomiting, fatigue, facial hair growth, numbness in
the arms and legs, irregular menstruation, hair loss, leg cramps, anxiety and
nervousness, vision problems, anemia, mood swings and depression, high blood
pressure, and removal complications that resulted in scarring." Id.
144. When a large number of claimants have brought suits involving com-
mon issues, it will enhance the prospects of a settlement for all parties if a few
claimants can first try these issues in "bellweather" trials in order to obtain in-
formation about the value of their cases as determined by the size of jury ver-
dicts (if any) in these trials. See In re Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016,
1019-20 (5th Cir. 1997).
145. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 713 A.2d 588 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1997).
146. Id. at 594.
147. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998).
148. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 2000).
149. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 713 A.2d 520, 524 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998).
150. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1247 (N.J. 1999).
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women's magazines such as Glamour, Mademoiselle, and Cosmo-
politan."'1 According to the plaintiffs, while these advertisements
extolled the simplicity and convenience of the Norplant device, they
failed to mention possible side effects, such as pain and permanent
scarring that might occur when the implants were removed.
Relying heavily on an article by Professors Hanson and Kysar,'5
the New Jersey court identified a number of concerns about direct-
to-consumer advertising."M For example, the court declared that "an
integral part of drug manufacturers' marketing strate ," was to ex-
ert pressure on consumers to ask for their products. " The court
also pointed out that manufacturers who engaged in direct-to-
consumer advertising seldom informed consumers about the specific
risks associated with using prescription products." Instead, the
court observed that warnings tended to be general rather than spe-
cific in nature and that consumers often interpreted these warnings
as assurances that the product was effective, not that it could be
dangerous."5 7
At this point, the court considered whether creating an excep-
tion to the learned intermediary rule was contrary to either the Re-
statement (Third) of Torts or to the New Jersey Products Liability
Act.158 As the court observed, section 6(d)(2) of the new Restatement
requires a prescription drug manufacturer to provide a warning di-
rectly to the patient "when the manufacturer knows or has reason to
know that health-care providers will not be in a position to reduce
the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warn-
ings."59 However, after attempts to create an express exception to
the learned intermediary rule for direct-to-consumer advertising
failed, the drafters of the Restatement decided to let "developing case
law" determine whether the courts should recognize such an excep-
tion under the auspices of section 6(d)(2)." The court in Perez de-
cided to take the drafters of the Restatement up on their offer to cre-
ate an exception for direct-to-consumer advertising.
The court also concluded that New Jersey's Products Liability
Act 6 ' did not foreclose it from creating an additional exception to the
learned intermediary rule.1" A provision of the Act defined an ade-
151. Id. at 1248.
152. Id.
153. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1420 (1999).
154. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1251-53.
155. Id. at 1251.
156. Id. at 1252-53.
157. Id. at 1253.
158. Id. at 1254-55.
159. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 6(d)(2) (1998).
160. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1253 (citing RESTATEMENT (TIuRD) OF ToTs:
PRODUCT LIABILITY § 6 cmt. e).
161. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C (West 2000).
162. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1253-54.
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quate warning for a prescription drug as one that a reasonably pru-
dent person would have provided, "taking into account the charac-
teristics of, and the ordinary knowledge common to, the prescribing
physician.'' While this language seemed to indicate that prescrip-
tion drug manufacturers were only required to warn physicians, the
Perez court insisted that the statute merely set forth the content of
physician-directed warnings when such warnings were required,
leaving the court free to identify the circumstances when such warn-
ings were legally sufficient."
Having disposed of these issues to its satisfaction, the Perez
court then discussed some of the rationales that had been invoked to
support the learned intermediary rule in the past and concluded
that, due to significant changes in the nature of the physician-
patient relationship, most of these rationales were no longer persua-
sive when drug companies engaged in direct-to-consumer advertis-
ing.'65 For example, the court declared that the doctrine of informed
consent, along with the development of managed health care sys-
tems, had significantly reduced the role of the physician as the pri-
mary decision-maker and source of information about medical
treatment.1 66 According to the court, the advent of the doctrine of in-
formed consent effectively destroyed the paternalism of the past and
gave patients a legal right to participate in treatment decisions.' 7
However, since physicians who practiced in a managed health care
environment often did not have time to inform patients adequately
about the risks and benefits of various prescription drugs, patients
would have to look elsewhere for information about the medications
they consumed.' 68 In the court's view, pharmaceutical companies
were a potential source of information about the products they
manufactured. At least when they engaged in direct-to-consumer
advertising, drug companies could communicate effectively with
consumers and, therefore, it made sense to require them to do so."'
The court also suggested that an enhanced duty to warn was par-
ticularly appropriate for so-called "life-style" drugs, such as Rogaine
or contraceptives, because they carried the risk of significant side ef-
fects, but were not medically necessary. °
After concluding that drug companies who advertised prescrip-
tion drugs directly to consumers must also provide them with ade-
quate warnings about drug-related risks, the court in Perez consid-
ered whether compliance with FDA labeling requirements provided
163. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 2000).
164. Perez, 734 A.2d. at 1254.




169. Id. at 1255-56.
170. Id. at 1257.
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any sort of safe harbor."' Unfortunately, the court's analysis of this
issue was not very enlightening.";' After describing the FDA's regu-
latory scheme, the court declared that the manufacturer's duty to
warn physicians was presumptively satisfied by compliance with
FDA labeling requirements.'7 It then applied this same rebuttable
presumption to warnings directed at consumers."'
The court gave two reasons for adopting this position. First, the
court seemed to think that there was some value in subjecting phy-
sician-directed and consumer-directed warnings to the same rule as
far as regulatory compliance was concerned.'7 ' Second, giving pre-
sumptive effect to compliance with FDA labeling regulations would
help to prevent over-deterrence by protecting pharmaceutical com-
panies against liability for "remotely possible, but not scientifically-
verifiable, side-effects of prescription drugs.""1 6 However, in a later
part of its opinion, the court seemed to withdraw much of the protec-
tion it had previously extended to drug manufacturers by declaring
that compliance with FDA standards would be "virtually dispositive"
of failure to warn claims "absent deliberate concealment or nondis-
closure of after-acquired knowledge of harmful effects.""' As one
commentator concluded, this language seems to mean that "[al fail-
ure to warn claim can be rebutted by a showing of compliance with
FDA regulations, unless, of course, it is a failure to warn claim."' 6
Finally, the Perez court held that a physician would not neces-
sarily break the chain of causation when he or she acted as a
learned intermediary."9 The court pointed out that while physicians
still exercised considerable influence over treatment decisions,
nowadays patients participated in this process to such a degree that
it was difficult to characterize the physician's role as sufficient to cut
off liability for drug companies if they breached their duty to warn."
More importantly, the court concluded as a matter of public policy
that the patient's right to complete and accurate information about
drug-related risks would be best safeguarded if both drug manufac-
turers and physicians were subject to tort liability for failing to dis-
close this information. 8'
At the present time, it is too soon to tell whether other courts
will follow the lead of the Perez court and also recognize an excep-
tion to the learned intermediary rule when the sellers of prescrip-
171. Id. at 1257-59.
172. See Fushman, supra note 67, at 1179.




177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. Fushman, supra note 67, at 1179.
179. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1262-63.
180. Id. at 1260.
181. Id. at 1262-63.
20021
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
tion drugs engage in direct-to-consumer advertising. To be sure, the
New Jersey Supreme Court has been responsible for many innova-
tions in American products liability law.'82 But not all such deci-
sions of this court have been followed by other courts,'8 3 and there is
reason to think that Perez falls into this latter category. The excep-
tion advocated by the Perez court is hard to justify in terms of either
doctrine or policy.
D. Arguments for a Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Exception
Critics of the learned intermediary rule have made a number of
arguments for refusing to apply the rule in cases where drug manu-
facturers engage in direct-to-consumer advertising. For example,
these critics contend that direct-to-consumer advertising and other
marketing practices have changed the nature of the physician-
patient relationship in a way that largely obviates the need for a
learned intermediary rule."M In addition, critics of the rule argue
that drug manufacturers who engage in mass marketing should be
held to the same duty to warn as the sellers of other consumer
goods.
1. Erosion of the Traditional Physician-Patient Relationship
Critics of the traditional learned intermediary rule contend that
consumers no longer passively defer to their physicians, but instead
actively participate in medical decisions that affect their health and
well-being.'85 One reason for this increased involvement in medical
decision-making is that marketing practices by prescription drug
companies have given consumers better access to information about
treatment options.'86 For example, drug manufacturers frequently
182. See, e.g., Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 290 A.2d 281, 285 (N.J. 1972) (re-
fusing to allow manufacturer to delegate responsibility for installing safety fea-
tures on punch press); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212
A.2d 769, 781 (N.J. 1965) (extending strict liability principles to bailments);
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314, 325-26 (N.J. 1965) (extending
strict liability principles to mass-produced housing); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 73-75 (N.J. 1960) (limiting privity of contract and dis-
claimer defenses in consumer sales).
183. See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 306 (N.J. 1983) (allowing a
jury to find a product to be defectively designed even though no safer alterna-
tive design existed); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539,
547-49 (N.J. 1982) (upholding liability for failure to warn of risks that were sci-
entifically unknowable at the time the product was manufactured); Santor v. A
& M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 312 (N.J. 1965) (applying strict liability
principles to pure economic losses).
184. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 840 (arguing that the "[piromotion of
prescription drugs has changed, and the premises on which the learned inter-
mediary rule is based do not necessarily reflect the reality of new marketing
practices").
185. Id. at 844 (stating that "patients are adopting a stronger role in the
doctor/patient relationship").
186. Noah, supra note 8, at 178 (declaring that "[d]irect advertising encour-
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offer "video tapes, brochures and information packets" about their
products and also provide toll-free telephone numbers where con-
sumers can obtain package inserts and other detailed information.""
In addition, information about specific prescription drugs is often
available on the drug company Internet sites, as well as those main-
tained by health organizations, independent chat rooms and news
188
groups.
The sale of prescription drugs over the Internet has also un-
dermined the classic physician-patient relationship. Today consum-
ers can log on to an online pharmacy and purchase prescription
drugs without any physical personal contact with a physician.1" In-
stead, consumers participate in an "online consultation," which often
involves nothing more than filling out a brief questionnaire about
general health information and other medication the individual may
be taking.19 ° The questionnaire is reviewed by a physician employed
by the online pharmacy who issues a prescription for the drug that
the consumer has requested. 9'
Finally, the emergence of HMOs and similar managed health
care plans has also reduced the power of prescribing physicians.
These organizations often obtain substantial price concessions from
pharmaceutical companies by agreeing to exclude competing prod-
ucts.192 However, this means that physicians who are affiliated with
these managed health care plans have less discretion when it comes
to prescription drugs.'93 In addition, patients may pressure physi-
cians who are associated with managed health care plans to pre-
scribe specific prescription products because these patients may go
elsewhere for medical treatment if physicians do not accede to their
demands. 94
There is no question that these developments have changed the
traditional physician-patient relationship. However, that does not
necessarily mean that the learned intermediary rule should be lim-
ited or abolished. In the first place, despite increased involvement
by patients in treatment decisions, in most cases they still rely upon
physicians to provide them with information about the risks and
benefits of various treatment options and to exercise their profes-
ages active participation by consumers in prescribing decisions").
187. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 838.
188. See Plant, supra note 17, at 104-07.
189. Rebecca Porter, Internet Pharmacies: Who's Minding the Store?, TRIAL,
May 2000, at 12, Kerry Toth Rost, Note, Policing the IVild West" World of
Internet Pharmacies, 76 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 1333, 1333-34 (2000).
190. Chuang, supra note 85, at 1455.
191. Id.
192. See Walsh et al., supra note 22, at 876.
193. Id. at 876-77.
194. Fushman, supra note 67, at 1172 (suggesting that "Iplhysicians assent
to patients demands for specific drugs because they cannot afford to lose pa-
tients in the modem managed care regime").
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sional judgment in selecting the most appropriate one.'95 Further-
more, because consumers cannot legally obtain prescription products
without a physician's consent, he or she continues to have the last
word about treatment decisions. Therefore, the most efficient and
effective way to transmit information about prescription drugs is to
direct this information primarily to physicians and to rely upon
them to convey what is needed to their patients. The learned inter-
mediary rule does just that.
2. Drug Companies Who Advertise to the Public Should Not
Receive Special Treatment
Critics of the learned intermediary rule sometimes suggest that
drug companies that engage in direct-to-consumer advertising
should be held to the same duty to warn as other sellers. These crit-
ics also point out that the advertising techniques employed for pre-
scription drugs resemble the techniques that are used to promote
commonplace consumer goods.9 Specifically, prescription drug ad-
vertising, particularly for life-style drugs, often plays upon the per-
sonal insecurities and vanities of listeners or viewers.'97 Having
chosen to market their products like toothpaste or laundry soap, the
critics would argue, pharmaceutical companies should be excluded
from the protection of a rule that governs a highly-specialized mar-
keting regime.
This is a powerful argument if one believes that the primary
purpose of the learned intermediary rule is to benefit pharmaceuti-
cal companies at the expense of consumers. Under this view of the
learned intermediary rule, one might justifiably conclude that drug
companies should lose the benefit of the rule because direct-to-
consumer advertising amounts to a waiver or estoppel on their part.
However, this argument collapses if one believes that the learned in-
termediary rule is primarily intended to ensure that information
about prescription drugs is transmitted to the ultimate consumer in
the most efficient manner. In other words, if the primary beneficiar-
ies of the learned intermediary rule are consumers, and not drug
companies, then the conduct of drug companies should not necessar-
ily determine whether the rule should be retained or not. Instead,
the determining factor should be whether or not manufacturers can
transmit information more efficiently by communicating solely with
prescribing physicians or whether the benefits of direct communica-
195. Noah, supra note 8, at 173 (observing that "advocates of an advertising
exception fail to appreciate the fact that a medical professional will continue to
intervene in the decision to prescribe a drug and make the final judgment about
its relative risks and benefits for a particular patient"); Paytash, supra note 5,
at 1356 (declaring that "while advertisements may induce patients to ask their
doctors for particular medications, the physician remains the decisionmaker
and the principal source of information about the product").




tions with consumers outweigh the costs.
IV. NEGLIGENT MARKETING
A second source of potential liability for pharmaceutical compa-
nies is a relatively new legal theory known as "negligent market-
ing." The concept of negligent marketing is based on the notion that
manufacturers should be required to market their products in a way
that minimizes the risk that consumers will injure themselves or
others. The advantage of negligent marketing over more conven-
tional product liability theories is that a claimant who relies on neg-
ligent marketing does not prove that the product in question is de-
fective. So far, virtually all reported negligent marketing cases have
involved handguns. However, plaintiffs' attorneys have recently in-
voked this theory at the trial level in a few high-profile prescription
drug cases.' If they are successful, one would expect negligent
marketing claims to proliferate significantly in the years ahead.
A- Types of Negligent Marketing
Litigation against handgun manufacturers has given rise to two
distinct forms of negligent marketing. The first type of negligent
marketing is based upon a product seller's advertising and promo-
tional activities, and the second is based upon its failure to super-
vise adequately the conduct of distributors and retail sellers.'" In
addition, it is possible that the courts may eventually recognize
other forms of negligent marketing in the future. One evolving form
of negligent marketing of particular interest to the pharmaceutical
industry is "overpromotion."
1. Targeting Vulnerable or Unsuitable Consumers
The first type of negligent marketing claim focuses on advertis-
ing or promotional efforts that are intended to induce unsuitable
persons to purchase products that are dangerous to themselves or
others. For example, anti-smoking advocates contend that the in-
famous cartoon character, Joe Camel, was introduced to create a fa-
vorable impression of smoking in the minds of young children and
thus to encourage them to become smokers at some time in the fu-
ture."°' Another cigarette company was forced to withdraw its men-
198. See In re: Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1348, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16624, at *21-22 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2001); Brumley v. Pfizer, Inc., 149 F. Supp.
2d 305, 307 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
199. See generally Andrew Jay McClurg, The Tortious Marketing of Hand-
guns: Strict Liability Is Dead, Long Live Negligence, 19 SE-rON HALL LEGIS. J.
777, 800-05 (1995) (discussing various categories of negligent marketing).
200. Erica Swecker, Note, Joe Camel: Will "Old Joe" Survive?, 36 W.1. &
MARY L. REv. 1519, 1519 (1995) (declaring that "[cligarette advertisements fea-
turing a 'sunglass-sporting, phalic-nosed,' camel named Joe, surrounded by his
'cool, jazz-playing, pool-hustling, poker-playing, cigarette-smoking' crowd of
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thol cigarette, "Uptown," because the product was deliberately tar-
geted at African-American consumers. ' Another instance of argua-
bly inappropriate targeting involved "Crazy Horse Malt Liquor," an
alcoholic beverage that was allegedly developed for sale to Native
Americans, a population that is afflicted by a very high level of alco-
holism. °2 While none of these examples involved litigation, they il-
lustrate the type of exploitation that might constitute negligent
marketing.
Negligent marketing also covers advertising and other promo-
tional efforts directed at groups who are likely to harm others.0 3
Advertising handguns or assault weapons to "criminal consumers" is
illustrative of this type of negligent marketing.0 4 In one case, for
example, the defendant allegedly advertised its product in Soldier of
Fortune and survivalist-type magazines, emphasized its firearm's
high volume of firepower and paramilitary appearance, and touted
the weapon's resistance to fingerprints. 2" The court concluded that
these practices increased the risk of product misuse by criminals
and, therefore, could form the basis for civil liability.
20 6
2. Failure to Supervise Retail Sellers
Another type of negligent marketing would subject manufactur-
ers to liability when they distribute their products in a way that en-
ables unauthorized users to obtain access to them from unscrupu-
lous retail sellers. For example, in one case,0 the plaintiffs alleged
that gun manufacturers had distributed large numbers of handguns
to southeastern states, where gun regulations were relatively lax,
knowing that many of these firearms would be shipped to urban
centers in the northeast where they would be sold illegally to felons
and others who were not legally entitled to possess them.2 ' The
camel-friends, have been accused of enticing children to smoke"); see also Daniel
Hays Lowenstein, Too Much Puff. Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial
Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1213 (1988) (suggesting that cigarette company
advertising deliberately targets minors); Frank J. Vandall, Reallocating the
Costs of Smoking: The Application of Absolute Liability to Cigarette Manufac-
turers, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 420 (1991) (making a similar argument).
201. Kathryn A. Kelly, The Target Marketing of Alcohol and Tobacco Bill-
boards to Minority Communities, 5 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POLy 33, 56-57 (1992);
Vernellia R. Randall, Smoking, the African-American Community, and the Pro-
posed National Tobacco Settlement, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 677, 684 (1998).
202. Celeste J. Taylor, Know When to Say When: An Examination of the Tax
Deduction for Alcohol Advertising that Targets Minorities, 12 LAw & INEQ. 573,
585 (1994).
203. McClurg, supra note 199, at 806.
204. Id.
205. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 156-57 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999), rev'd, 26 Cal. 4th 465 (2001).
206. Id. at 172.
207. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
208. Id. at 830-31.
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trial court agreed with the plaintiffs that the defendants had a duty
to exercise reasonable measures to prevent their products from be-
ing used to supply illegal gun markets in other states!" Recently, a
number of cities and counties have made similar allegations in their,, . 211
suits against gun manufacturers.
3. Overpromotion
The term "overpromotion" traditionally referred to advertising
that diluted the effects of product warnings.1  However, it can be
argued that efforts by manufacturers to induce intermediaries to
distribute their product in a way that increases the risk of injury
can also be described as overpromotion. Although this form of over-
promotion has not yet been invoked in handgun litigation, it has
been raised, at least implicitly, in the prescription drug context.
Specifically, some claimants have alleged that prescription drug
sales representatives have encouraged or pressured physicians to
overprescribe certain drugs such as antidepressants and painkill-
212ers.
B. Negligent Marketing in Firearms Litigation
So far, all reported cases in which a negligent marketing claim
was made involved firearms. An examination of these cases indi-
cates that courts are currently reluctant to accept this new, and po-
tentially expansive, theory of liability. Negligent marketing claims,
which were first raised in the 1980s, were uniformly unsuccessful, 3
as were later claims brought in the 1990s.2 The first breakthrough
209. Id. at 832.
210. Winifred Weitsen Boyle, Comment, There's No Smoking Gun: Cities
Should Not Sue the Firearms Industry, 25 U. DAYTON L. REv,. 215, 224 (2000);
Doug Morgan, Comment, What in the Wide, Wide World of Torts Is Going On?
First Tobacco, Now Guns: An Examination of Hamilton v. Accu-Tek and the Cit-
ies' Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry, 69 MIss. L.J. 521, 533 (1999). In many
of these suits, the negligent marketing claim is characterized as a "public nui-
sance" claim. Scott Preston, Comment, Targeting the Gun Industry: Munici-
palities Aim to Hold Manufacturers Liable for Their Products arid Actions, 24 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 595, 603-05 (2000).
211. Anne G. Kimball & Sarah L. Olson, When All Else Fails, Blame Madi-
son Avenue: Negligent Marketing Claims in Firearm Litigation, 36 ToRT &
INsUR. L.J. 981, 1001 (2001).
212. See infra, Part C.1.
213. See Riordan v. Int'l Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1296 (Il1. Ct.
App. 1985); Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339, 340 (Ill. Ct. App. 1984);
Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661, 664 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
214. See Leslie v. United States, 986 F. Supp. 900, 912-13 (D.N.J. 1997);
McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 916 F. Supp. 366, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd
sub nom. McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 1997); First Com-
mercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Eng'g, Inc., 900 S.W.2d 202, 204-05 (Ark. 1995);
Resteiner v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 566 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997);
Forni v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
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occurred in 1999 with the Hamilton and Merrill decisions." 5
1. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek
In Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,216 a group of plaintiffs successfully
brought negligent marketing claims in a New York federal district
court against twenty-five handgun manufacturers. The plaintiffs
argued that the defendants had a duty to market and distribute
their products in a manner that would minimize the chances that
they would fall into the hands of persons who were likely to use
them in the commission of criminal acts.217 The plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants shipped large numbers of firearms to southeast-
ern states, where gun regulations were less stringent, knowing that
these guns would eventually be transported to northeastern states
and sold illegally.28 The defendants, on the other hand, maintained
that they sold their products to federally licensed dealers and had no
duty to protect shooting victims from the criminal acts of third par-
ties.22 9 They also denied that their marketing practices were negli-
gent and further contended that the plaintiffs had failed to provide
satisfactory proof of cause-in-fact.20
The trial judge, Jack Weinstein, a distinguished jurist, con-
cluded that the defendants had a duty to market their products in a
reasonable and prudent manner.22' In addition, he relieved the
plaintiffs of the burden of showing which specific product caused
which injury and instead allowed them to establish causation
through the use of a market share liability approach.2 Judge
Weinstein's opinion discussed a variety of legal issues associated
with the plaintiffs' claims, including: (1) whether gun manufacturers
owed any legal duty to bystanders who might be injured by firearms;
(2) whether the defendants failed to exercise due care with respect
to their marketing activities; (3) whether the marketing practices of
the defendants caused the victims' injuries; (4) whether the criminal
acts of third persons amounted to a superseding cause, thereby re-
lieving the defendants of any responsibility for shooting victims' in-
juries; and (5) whether gun manufacturers could be held collectively
215. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Merrill v.
Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
216. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
217. Id. at 825.
218. Id. at 829-30.
219. Id. at 832.
220. Id. at 817-18.
221. Id. at 827.
222. Id. at 843-44. For an analysis of market share liability, see David A.
Fischer, Products Liability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 1623 (1981); Andrew R. Klein, Beyond DES: Rejecting the Application of
Market Share Liability in Blood Products Litigation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 883 (1994);
Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94
HARV. L. REV. 668 (1981).
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liable for damages on a market share basis. '
The first issue in Hamilton was whether the defendants were
obliged to protect casual bystanders from injuries caused by non-
defective products. While admitting that New York law subjected a
manufacturer to strict liability only when it placed a defective prod-
uct into the stream of commerce,2 4 the trial court concluded that
negligence principles were broad enough to support a duty of due
care toward bystanders even when a product was not defective. "25
The court also determined that the manufacturers had breached this
duty of care. 6 The court observed that the risk of injury was very
great if handguns fell into the hands of those who were likely to use
them to commit crimes.2" Moreover, most guns used in crimes were
not stolen, but were purchased, often illegally, from federally li-
censed firearms dealers.m In the court's view, the defendants could
have reduced these illegal sales by refusing to do business with care-
less or unscrupulous gun dealers, by limiting sales at unregulated
gun shows, and by requiring that handguns be sold to the public
only in responsibly-operated retail stores.' The court also found
that the defendants were fully aware that their marketing practices
were facilitating the movement of guns from the southeast into the
underground markets in the northeastern part of the country.'
Another issue was whether the defendants' negligent marketing
practices were a cause-in-fact of shooting deaths generally and
whether there was some causal connection between these practices
and the specific injuries suffered by the plaintiffs." ' In this case, the
court found that the defendants' marketing practices had indeed fa-
cilitated an influx of illegal firearms into New York City, ' thereby
making them more readily available to the sorts of person who had
injured the plaintiffs.m The fourth issue before the court involved
proximate cause. The defendants argued for the traditional position
that the criminal actions of third parties should be treated as un-
foreseeable superseding events that broke the chain of causation
and relieved them of any liability.23' However, the court pointed out
that an intervening act would not be sufficient to insulate a defen-
dant from liability if it were a natural and foreseeable consequence
223. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 818-35.
224. Id. at 823.
225. Id. at 823-24.
226. Id. at 827-29.
227. Id. at 825-26; see also Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1313-
14 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (reviewing data and supporting sources).
228. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 825-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
229. Id. at 826.
230. Id. at 832.
231. Id. at 834-35.
232. Id. at 836-37.
233. Id. at 837-38.
234. Id. at 810-11.
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of a condition created by the defendant. 235 Having already deter-
mined that the defendants had a duty to anticipate and guard
against misuse of its products by third parties, the court had no dif-
ficulty concluding that such misuse, when it did occur, would not be
regarded as a superseding cause.2 36 The final issue before the court
involved apportionment of damages among the various defendants.
Rather than requiring the plaintiffs to establish what each defen-
dant's share should be, the trial court approved instructions that al-
lowed the jury to apportion damages among the various gun manu-
facturers according to their respective shares of the handgun
market."
At the end of the trial, the jury returned a verdict against fif-
teen of the defendants and in favor of one of the plaintiffs. 38 On ap-
peal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that it was
necessary to certify two questions to the New York Court of Appeals:
(1) Did New York recognize a duty on the part of gun manufacturers
to exercise due care with respect to the marketing and distribution
of firearms; and (2) can damages in negligent marketing cases be
apportioned according to principles of market share liability?39 The
New York state court agreed to answer these questions, and eventu-
ally ruled that handgun manufacturers did not owe a duty to market
their products in such a way as to reduce the risk of injury to third
parties from criminals. 2 ° The New York court also concluded that it
was inappropriate to apply the concept of market share liability to
handgun manufacturers. 4'
In its discussion of the duty issue, the New York court pointed
out that tort law did not impose a duty on someone simply because
his or her conduct might cause harm to others.242 According to the
court, foreseeability does not determine whether a duty exists or
not; it merely determines the scope of the duty once it is found to ex-
ist.243 In addition, it is not enough for an injured party to show that
the defendant owed a general duty of due care to society; rather, the
plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed a specific duty to
him or her.244
This usually involves the existence of a special relationship be-
tween the defendant and either the victim or the wrongdoer.2 '
Thus, a duty to protect another might arise when a special relation-
235. Id. at 833 (quoting Kush v. Buffalo, 449 N.E.2d 725, 729 (N.Y. 1983)).
236. Id. at 834.
237. Id. at 846-47.
238. Id. at 808.
239. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36, 46 (2d Cir. 2000).
240. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1066 (N.Y. 2001).
241. Id. at 1068.
242. Id. at 1060.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1061.
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ship, such as employer-employee or parent-child, exists between the
defendant and a third-party tortfeasor.' Because of the relation-
ship in these cases, however, the defendant is in the best position to
prevent the harm and, moreover, the risk of unlimited liability is re-
duced because the class of people to whom a duty is owed is circum-
scribed by the relationship.247 In this case, as the court pointed out,
the pool of potential victims was extremely large and no relationship
existed that would give gun manufacturers the power to control the
actions of criminals. 248 Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs ar-
gument that market share liability should be applied with respect to
claims against handgun manufacturers.4 9
2. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.
Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.20 involved a suit against the manufac-
turer of two semiautomatic assault weapons, the TEC-9 and the
TEC-DC9 (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "TEC-DC9"),
which were used by one Gian Ferri to kill eight persons and to
wound six others before he killed himself." It appears that Ferri
purchased the guns from properly licensed dealers; however, he vio-
lated the law by transporting the weapons from Nevada, where they
were legal, to California, where they were not.1 ' The plaintiffs ar-
gued, inter alia, that even though the sale of the guns was legal, the
defendant, Navegar, should be held liable because it had promoted
and marketed its products in a way that increased their appeal to
those likely to commit criminal acts.' The trial court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs ap-
pealed.'
The California intermediate appellate court determined that
both the physical characteristics of the weapons and the manner in
which they were marketed greatly increased the risk that they
would be acquired and used for criminal purposes.' The court ob-
served that the weapons were designed to accept large capacity 50-
round magazines; they were equipped with "barrel shrouds" which
allowed the user to hold the weapon with both hands in order to
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1061-62.
249. Id. at 1066-68. Upon receipt of the New York court's opinion, the fed-
eral appeals court ordered the trial court to dismiss the plaintiffs lawsuit.
Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21, 32 (2d Cir. 2001).
250. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
251. Id. at 152.
252. Id. at 153-54.
253. Id. at 156. The plaintiffs also claimed that the manufacture and sale of
the TEC-DC9 semi-automatic pistol was an ultra-hazardous activity. Id. at
152. The court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of that claim. Id. at 192.
254. Id. at 192.
255. Id. at 167.
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spray fire; the barrels were threaded to allow the attachment of si-
lencers or flash suppressors; they were fitted with a sling device that
enabled them to be fired rapidly from the hip; they were compact
and were capable of being broken down for better concealment; and
they were compatible with a "Hell Fire" trigger system that permit-
ted the weapon to be fired at a much faster rate than a normal
semiautomatic weapon.5 6 Moreover, a TEC-DC9 equipped with
such a trigger mechanism could easily be modified to perform like a
fully automatic weapon.257 These features not only made the TEC-
DC9 function like a military-style submachine gun, they also sub-
stantially reduced the weapon's utility for legitimate purposes such
as hunting, sport shooting, or self-defense.258
The court also pointed out that Navegar seemed to have delib-
erately targeted the marketing of the TEC-DC9 toward persons, like
the killer, who were attracted to or associated with violence.29 First
of all, the defendant advertised its products in magazines, such as
Soldier of Fortune, SWAT, Combat Handguns, Guns, Firepower, and
Heavy Metal Weapons, which were widely read by militarists and
survivalists.26 Moreover, this advertising emphasized the paramili-
tary character of the weapons by referring to their non-glare finish
and combat-type sights.26 ' In addition, Navegar's promotional mate-
rials called attention to certain features of the TEC-DC9 that would
make it particularly suitable for criminal use. For example, these
materials mentioned that the weapons came with a combat sling
and a threaded barrel, which permitted the attachment of a silencer,
flash suppressor, or a barrel extension. 22 They also extolled the fact
that the TEC-DC9's surface had "excellent resistance to finger-
prints."2 63 Furthermore, Navegar displayed its weapons at the sort
of gun shows that such persons often attended." Finally, Navegar
provided TEC-DC9s for use in violent films and television programs,
such as Robocop, Freejack, and Miami Vice in order to create an as-
sociation in the public eye between its products and acts of vio-
lence.265
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
256. Id. at 154.
257. Id. at 157.
258. Id. at 154-55.
259. Id. at 156.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 157.
263. Id. As Navegar correctly pointed out, this claim merely meant that the
surface was resistant to damage from oil or sweat when handled. Id. at 159.
However, the court concluded that some purchasers would interpret Navegar's
claim as an assurance that they could use the TEC without fear of leaving be-
hind fingerprints that might identify them to the police. Id. at 157.
264. Id. at 156.
265. Id. at 157.
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judgment.266 In deciding whether the lower court should have al-
lowed the plaintiffs' claims against Navegar to go to trial, the inter-
mediate appellate court examined the issues of duty and causa-
tion.267 In its discussion of the duty issue, the court found that the
risk associated with the defendant's conduct was foreseeable" Al-
though Navegar denied that it could have foreseen that its products
would be used in a killing spree, the court found the manufacturer
was well aware that the TEC-DC9 was often used in criminal as-
saults and that many of its features were designed to appeal to
criminal users. 9 Second, the court determined that Navegar's con-
duct was "morally blameworthy."27° Evidence of blameworthy con-
duct included: (1) Navegar's marketing of the TEC-DC9 in a way
that was calculated to bring it to the attention of those who were
likely to use it for criminal purposes; (2) the indifference of Nave-
gar's management to the fact that their product was commonly used
for criminal purposes; and (3) the furnishing by Navegar's market-
ing director of manuals and videotapes which demonstrated how to
convert illegally the TEC-DC9 into a fully automatic weapon.
The third factor to be considered in determining whether to im-
pose a duty on the defendant was the public interest in preventing
future harm.2 The court in Merrill observed that the direct costs of
gunshot-related injuries amounted to $2.3 billion annually. 3 Other
costs included such things as lost wages, pain and suffering, police
resources, and "the psychological insecurity we all suffer from living
in a gun-infested society."27 ' The court pointed out that public pol-
icy, as expressed by courts and legislative institutions, strongly sup-
ported the reduction of these social costs. " The final factor was the
burden that such a duty would impose on the defendant and on the
community. 76 In this case, the gun manufacturer would simply
have to refrain from marketing its products to high-risk consum-
ers.
277
Having concluded that Navegar owed a duty to market its prod-
ucts in a reasonable manner, the Merrill court proceeded to consider
whether the defendant's marketing practices caused the plaintiffs'
266. Id. at 152.
267. Id. at 161.
268. Id. at 167.
269. Id. at 166.
270. Id. at 169.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 169-70 (citing Philip J. Cook et al., The Medical Costs of Gunshot
Injuries in the United States, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 447,454 (1999)).
274. Id. at 170 (quoting Andrew Jay McClurg, The Tortious Marketing of
Handguns: Strict Liability Is Dead, Long Live Negligence, 19 SETON HALL LEGIs.
J. 777, 792 (1995)).
275. Id.
276. Id. (citing Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1997)).
277. Id. at 171.
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injuries. 278  Not surprisingly, Navegar argued that there was no
causal connection between its marketing efforts and the killer's
criminal behavior.2 79 In particular, the gun manufacturer contended
that the plaintiffs had produced no evidence that the killer, Ferri,
ever saw any of the company's advertisements or promotions.28 ° The
court held that the plaintiffs did not have to prove that Navegar's
conduct was the sole cause of their injuries; rather, the causation
requirement could be satisfied by showing that Navegar's conduct
was a "substantial factor" in bringing about these injuries.28" ' The
court also declared that a defendant's conduct could be characterized
as a contributing cause if it created or increased the risk of negligent
or criminal behavior even though the defendant did not exercise any
control over the party that actually caused the harm.282
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed the interme-
diate appellate court's decision and reinstated the trial court's
judgment for the defendant.283 The principal ground for this reversal
was the court's characterization of the plaintiffs' case as a "products
liability action" within the purview of California Civil Code section
1714.4(a).2" This statutory provision declared that "[i]n a products
liability action, no firearm or ammunition shall be deemed defective
in design on the basis that the benefits of the product do not out-
weigh the risk of injury posed by its potential to cause serious in-
jury, damage, or death when discharged."28 The court rejected the
plaintiffs' assertion that they were seeking to hold Navegar liable
because it "negligently designed, distributed, and marketed" the
TEC-DC9.2 86 Instead, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' real
claim was that the weapon was "defective in design because the
risks of making it unavailable to the general public outweighed the
benefits of that conduct."
2 87
Furthermore, the court concluded, even if Navegar's marketing
activities would support an independent negligence claim, the plain-
tiffs had failed to prove cause-in-fact because they offered no evi-
dence to show that the killer, Gian Ferri, was influenced by, or had
even seen, the defendant's promotional materials.88 According to
the court, Ferri apparently purchased the defendant's products from
a retail seller on the basis of price and information supplied by the
seller about the weapons' firepower and other performance charac-
278. Id. at 185.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 185-86.
281. Id. at 186.
282. Id.
283. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 119 (Cal. 2001).
284. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4(a) (Deering 1994).
285. Id.
286. Merrill, 28 P.3d at 124-25.
287. Id. at 126.




C. Potential Negligent Marketing Claims Against Pharmaceutical
Companies
Negligent marketing that involves advertising that targets vul-
nerable or dangerous users does not seem relevant to the promotion
and sale of prescription drugs. However, the two remaining types of
negligent marketing, overpromotion and negligent failure to super-
vise retail sellers, may be applicable to prescription drug sales and,
therefore, will be discussed in more detail below.
1. Overpromotion
One type of negligent marketing involves the efforts of manu-
facturers to pressure or bribe doctors to prescribe certain prescrip-
tion drugs, such as painkillers or anti-depressants, in excessive dos-
ages or to persons who do not really need them. Recent experience
involving the painkiller OxyContin illustrates the potential applica-
bility of this form of negligent marketing to prescription drug sell-
ers.
OxyContin is the brand name of oxycodone hydrochloride, a
synthetic opiate, which chemically resembles other opiates such as
heroin, morphine, codeine, fentanyl, or methadone. It is a slow-
release painkiller that is designed to last twelve hours and is in-
tended for use by persons who suffer moderate to severe chronic
pain from such diseases as arthritis, back trouble, or cancer." ' Un-
fortunately, when OxyContin pills are crushed, users can achieve a
quick, heroin-like high.' OxyContin abuse started in the rural ar-
eas of Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia, Tennessee, and Maine, but
quickly spread to urban areas such as Boston and Miami.' At least
thirteen lawsuits have already been filed by OxyContin users
against the drug's manufacturer, Purdue Pharma.'
Although Purdue Pharma did not advertise OxyContin to the
general public, some plaintiffs have alleged conduct on its part that
could be described as negligent marketing." For example, one vic-
289. Id. at 133.
290. Paul Tough, The Alchemy of OxyContin, N.Y. TIMEs, July 29, 2001,
(Magazine), at 32.
291. Maker of Painkiller OxyContin Faces Lawsuits Alleging the Drug
Caused Addictions, Deaths; Company Says Plaintiffs Used Drug Improperly or
Illegally, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 29, 2001, at All.
292. Id.
293. Suits Claim OxyContin Addiction, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., July 27, 2001,
at 8A.
294. Maker of Painkiller OxyContin Faces Lawsuits, supra note 291.
295. FDA regulations prohibited the manufacturer from advertising narcotic
drugs to the public. However, Purdue Pharma did engage in a public education
program, Partners Against Pain, which promoted greater use of pain-relief
therapy in connection with the treatment of cancer and other diseases. Tough,
20021
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
tim alleged that the manufacturer "conspired and knowingly pro-
moted and sold OxyContin by enticing doctors to prescribe the drug
using free airline tickets, motel stays, vacations, seminars and other
means without regard as to the safety of the drug, and without
warning these physicians as to the true dangers it possessed."296 In
addition, the Attorney General of West Virginia charged Purdue
Pharma with "highly coercive and inappropriate tactics to attempt
to get physicians and pharmacists to prescribe OxyContin and to fill
prescriptions for OxyContin, often when it was not called for."2 97 Ar-
guably, these allegations, if they could be proven, might support a
negligent marketing claim against the drug's manufacturer.
The recent experience with the diet drug, Fen-Phen, illustrates
another aspect of negligent marketing, the promotion of "off-label"
uses by product manufacturers. An off-label use is a use that is not
described or authorized on a prescription drug's FDA-approved la-
beling.298 It is common and acceptable medical practice for physi-
cians to prescribe off-label uses of prescription drugs.29 9 However,
the FDA prohibits attempts by manufacturers to "promote" unap-
proved or off-label uses of prescription drugs.00 Of course, manufac-
turers have a strong economic incentive to encourage off-label uses
since these uses increase the sales of their products.3 ' Conse-
quently, manufacturers disseminate information about off-label uses
indirectly by funding research, sponsoring educational programs
302and symposia, and distributing journal articles about such uses.
Unfortunately, off-label uses sometimes turn out to be dangerous or
inappropriate.0 3 When this occurs, sub rosa marketing efforts by
manufacturers may give rise to liability if they encourage doctors to
prescribe prescription drugs for off-label uses that prove to be harm-
ful.
Fen-Phen is a combination of two distinct pharmaceutical prod-
ucts, fenfluramine and phentermine. These drugs were approved by
the FDA more than twenty years ago for use individually and on a
short-term basis by medically diagnosed obese patients.' °4 When a
supra note 290, at 52.
296. Raleigh Man Suing OxyContin Makers; Beaver Resident Claims that he
was Harmed by Drug, CHARLESTON GAZETrE & DAILY MAIL (W. Va.), July 21,
2001, at 2A.
297. Tough, supra note 290, at 52.
298. Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, Comment, Products Liability and "Off-Label"
Uses of Prescription Drugs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 275 (1996).
299. David A. Kessler, Regulating the Prescribing of Human Drugs for Non-
approved Uses Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 15 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.
693, 695 (1978); Merrill, supra note 15, at 1854; Noah, supra note 62, at 141.
300. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a) (2001).
301. Stoffelmayr, supra note 298, at 279.
302. See J. Howard Beales, III, Economic Analysis and the Regulation of
Pharmaceutical Advertising, 24 SETONHALLL. REV. 1370, 1394-96 (1994).
303. Moberg, supra note 48, at 221-22.
304. Caren A. Crisanti, Comment, Product Liability and Prescription Diet
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1992 study indicated that fenfluramine and phentermine were more
effective when used in combination, doctors began prescribing these
drugs on a large scale for weight-loss purposes.3 As many as six
million people are thought to have used the Fen-Phen combina-
tion."6 However, medical studies began to show a connection be-
tween fenfluramine use and serious heart valve damage."° This led
the FDA to take fenfluramine, known commercially as Redux, off
the market in September 1997.30' Litigation against American
Home Products, the manufacturer of Redux, soon followed.' After
several cases resulted in substantial damage awards, American
Home Products offered to settle most of the remaining cases for
$3.75 billion.310
Redux labeling contained warnings about known side effects,
such as brain damage and hypertension, but nothing was said about
heart valve damage because there was no evidence to suggest that
this was a danger at the time the drug's labeling was approved by
the FDA.31' Nevertheless, if there is further litigation, plaintiffs are
likely to argue that the manufacturers of Fen-Phen encouraged doc-
tors to prescribe these drugs for mildly overweight people when lit-
tle was known about the possible effects of long-term use or use of
these drugs in combination with each other.
2. Negligent Failure to Supervise Retail Sellers
A second type of negligent marketing involves a manufacturer's
failure to supervise the activities of retail sellers. Once again, the
OxyContin litigation illustrates how a negligent marketing claim
might be made. Plaintiffs in one of these suits, a class action suit
recently filed in Ohio, have claimed the manufacturer and others
"were and are facilitating the inappropriate use of OxyContin by
supplying pharmacies in Mexico with OxyContin because they are
aware that members of the public can obtain OxyContin from these
pharmacies without a prescription."3 2 This allegation, which has
been vigorously disputed by OxyContin's manufacturer, resembles
one of the negligent marketing claims brought against handgun
manufacturers in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek.
Drug Cocktail, Fen-Phen: A Hard Combination to Swallow, 15 J. CONrEMP.
HEALTH L. & POLY 207, 211 (1998).
305. Id. at 207, 211-12.
306. Patrick Strawbridge, Diet-Drug Trial Set in Bluffs, OMAhiA WoitLD-
HERALD, April 16, 2000, at 1A.
307. Crisanti, supra note 304, at 210-11.
308. Id. at 211; Strawbridge, supra note 306.
309. Strawbridge, supra note 306.
310. Richard B. Schmitt & Robert Langreth, AHP To Pay $ 3.75 Billion in
Diet Suits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1999, at A3.
311. Crisanti, supra note 304, at 222-23.
312. Rob Modic, Oxycontin Class-Action Suit Filed, DATrON DAILY NEWS,
July 20, 2001, at 2, available at LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File.
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Internet pharmacies may turn out to be another source of negli-
gent marketing liability. As the name implies, an Internet phar-
macy sells pharmaceutical products to consumers through its web-
site.313 These sites offer lower prices, around-the-clock availability,
increased privacy, and better access to prescription drugs for the
elderly and those who live in rural areas.314 Internet sites can be
categorized as pharmacy-based or prescribing-based. 311 "Pharmacy-
based" sites are state-licensed and require the patient to obtain an
off-site doctor's prescription 1 6 However, "prescribing-based" sites
typically sell prescription drugs on the basis of a perfunctory "online
consultation" between the customer and a physician employed by
the Internet pharmacy.317 Furthermore, some of these prescribing-
based sites are located outside the United States and do not require
any sort of prescription to order medicine.1 8 Sooner or later, plain-
tiffs will begin to argue that drug companies have a duty to exercise
some degree of supervision over the operations of Internet pharma-
cies319 and that their failure to do so should give rise to liability un-
der the theory of negligent marketing.
V. INCREASED LIABILITY FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUG
MANUFACTURERS
One can argue that aggressive marketing practices justify the
creation of additional duties with respect to those who may be sub-
jected to increased risks. This Article has described two doctrinal
changes by which the obligations of drug companies might be ex-
panded. Abolishing the learned intermediary rule would require
manufacturers of prescription drugs to formulate warnings for con-
sumers as well as for physicians, while recognizing the concept of
negligent marketing would require drug manufacturers to exercise
more restraint in their dealings with physicians and to show more
interest in the activities of retail sellers. Of course, failure to satisfy
these additional duties would result in tort liability for product sell-
ers.
A. Abolishing or Restricting the Learned Intermediary Rule
A number of legal commentators believe that the current
scheme of physician-directed warnings does not provide sufficient
313. Rost, supra note 189, at 1333.
314. Nicole A. Rothstein, Comment, Protecting Privacy and Enabling Phar-
maceutical Sales on the Internet: A Comparative Analysis of the United States
and Canada, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 343, 350 (2001).
315. Chuang, supra note 85, at 1455.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1456. It is illegal for foreign Internet pharmacies to ship pre-
scription drugs into the United States, but these regulations are often difficult
to enforce. See also Porter, supra note 189, at 13.
319. See Chuang, supra note 85, at 1483-88.
[Vol. 37
AGGRESSIVE MARKETING
protection for consumers. Presumably, if drug companies warned
consumers directly, they would read these warnings and would re-
frain from taking prescription drugs that were dangerous or unsuit-
able for them. This, in theory, would cause the number of injuries
associated with prescription drug use to decline. Of course, direct-
to-consumer warnings might also scare off some consumers or dis-
courage them from seeking professional help for treatable medical
conditions. Thus, it is difficult to determine, a priori, whether di-
rect-to-consumer warnings would actually reduce public health costs
or not.
What is clear, however, is that drug companies will have to de-
fend many more failure-to-warn claims. As mentioned earlier, the
requirements for direct-to-consumer warnings are not easy to sat-
isfy. Warnings directed at ordinary consumers must be complete
and accurate; they must be sufficiently prominent that consumers
will see them; they cannot be ambiguous or equivocal; they must be
easy for ordinary consumers to understand; and they must be com-
municated effectively to their intended audience.
It is difficult to see how drug manufacturers can provide con-
sumers with complete and understandable information about prod-
uct-related risks through direct communication. The general warn-
ings provided in radio or television broadcasts are much too short to
satisfy the requirements for an adequate warning.' Print adver-
tisements are also problematic because information about product-
related risks and contraindications is seldom found in the front page
of such ads, but rather appears (often in small print) on the back
page."' Moreover, the FDA-approved "brief summary," typically
contained therein, is often impossible for the average consumer to
understand."u Nor are brochures, Internet sites, or references to
toll-free numbers likely to satisfy a manufacturer's duty to warn
since many consumers will not utilize these sources of information.
Although drug manufacturers might try to satisfy their duty to warn
by providing patient package inserts (distributed by pharmacists
when a prescription is filled), they would have considerable diffi-
culty explaining such matters as side effects, contraindications, and
related matters in terms that ordinary consumers could appreciate.
Moreover, even if pharmaceutical companies were able to provide
adequate warnings by means of package inserts, plaintiffs' lawyers
might still argue that direct-to-consumer advertising amounted to
"overpromotion" of the drug, thereby diluting the effect of the warn-
320. Michael C. Allen, Medicine Goes Madison Aven tie: An Evaluation of the
Effect of Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising on the Learned Inter-
mediary Doctrine, 20 CAMPBELL L. REv. 113, 129-30 (1997) (stating that "at-
tempts in direct-to-consumer ad to adequately convey sufficient information to
enable a consumer to make a reasonably informed and educated decision would
be prohibitively lengthy and difficult to convey").
321. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 846.
322. Id. at 847.
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ing's effectiveness.323
B. Negligent Marketing
Negligent marketing is a bonanza for plaintiffs and a nightmare
for defendants. First, a plaintiff does not have to prove that a prod-
uct was defective in order to bring a negligent marketing claim. In
addition, since negligent marketing and failure to warn are different
legal concepts, a pharmaceutical company cannot invoke the learned
intermediary rule to defeat liability when a negligent marketing
claim is brought. Another disadvantage from the defendant's point
of view is that the liability standard for negligent marketing is es-
sentially meaningless. There is no objective way to determine when
a particular marketing practice is appropriate and when it can be
characterized as negligent. Furthermore, in a negligent marketing
case, the primary focus is on the conduct of the product manufac-
turer, making it easier for plaintiffs' lawyers to prejudice the jury by
portraying the defendant as irresponsible or unethical. Finally, neg-
ligent marketing claims are predominantly factual in nature and,
therefore, will ultimately be determined by lay juries.
C. Tort Litigation in the Twenty-first Century
Recent developments in tort litigation practice virtually ensure
that the imposition of new duties will have a significant, and decid-
edly negative, impact on the financial well-being of prescription
drug companies. Many courts have relaxed the traditional causa-
tion requirements, effectively relieving plaintiffs of their duty to
prove cause-in-fact. For example, in negligent marketing cases,
courts have enabled plaintiffs to overcome serious causation prob-
lems by allowing plaintiffs to satisfy proof of causation by relying on
such concepts as the substantial factor test 324 and market share li-
ability.325 The ability to aggregate claims through the use of class
actions and other techniques also benefits plaintiffs. By pooling
their resources, large groups of plaintiffs can afford to hire the very
best legal talent and to spend large sums on litigation. Moreover,
aggregation of claims raises the stakes for defendants. Losing a
class action is a far more serious matter than losing an individual
case. Finally, the availability of punitive damages greatly affects
the dynamics of litigation.
With the benefit of these advantages, it is not surprising that
plaintiffs' lawyers love to sue pharmaceutical companies. These
companies, on the other hand, are sufficiently concerned about the
consequences of losing high-profile class action cases that they will
323. See Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 220 (Pa. 1971) (holding that
promotional efforts of drug manufacturer's sales representatives diluted the ef-
fectiveness of warning in physician package insert).
324. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
325. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
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sometimes choose to settle a case even when the plaintiffs' claims
are groundless. In re Dow Corning321 is a case in point. When a
class action was brought against Dow Corning, the company settled
the suit for more than $3 billion even though there was no scientific
evidence to support the plaintiffs' claim that the defendant's breast
127implants caused their injuries. Even when drug companies refuse
to settle, the high costs of litigation may eventually force them to cut
their losses by removing a product from the market.
All of this suggests that increased liability, even if it reduces in-
juries, imposes costs on society. In the case of prescription drugs,
abolishing the learned intermediary rule or recognizing the concept
of negligent marketing, will impose higher liability costs on pharma-
ceutical companies. At some point, this increased financial burden
may begin to adversely affect the availability and price of prescrip-
tion drugs. For this reason, courts should be cautious about recog-
nizing new theories of liability, particularly if the increased risks to
consumers attributable to aggressive marketing can be dealt with by
other regulatory mechanisms. Since prescription drug labeling and
advertising are already regulated by the FDA, it seems reasonable
to allow this agency to formulate additional regulations, if neces-
sary, than to try to control the marketing practices of drug manufac-
turers by increasing the scope of tort liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
Pharmaceutical companies have added new forms of marketing,
such as direct-to-consumer advertising, to supplement more tradi-
tional physician-directed efforts. While these newer marketing
techniques appear to be quite effective, it is possible that they may
also lead to new forms of tort liability. In particular, courts may re-
fuse to apply the learned intermediary rule to manufacturers who
engage in direct-to-consumer advertising or they may impose liabil-
ity on pharmaceutical companies for negligent marketing. Perhaps,
it may become necessary to regulate the marketing activities of drug
companies more extensively. If that becomes necessary, however,
the FDA, not the courts, should exercise this responsibility.
326. 255 B.R. 445 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
327. District Judge Affirms Confirmation Order in Dow Corning Settlement,
MEALEY's LrrIG. REP. INS. 5, Nov. 21, 2000.
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